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Increasing demand for public services presents problems which could 
be ignored in an earlier period. As long as public revenue needs of 
states and localities were modest the impact of tax measures was not of 
great consequence to anyone. This is no longer the case as events in 
recent years clearly demonstrate. Bond elections often fail to find a 
majority and governors are elected on platforms promising no new taxes. 
In this atmosphere of uncertainty conc~rning new sources of revenue the 
incidence of state and local.taxes becomes an important issue for both 
legislators and taxpayers. A legislator would like to know how the 
cost of .Providing public goods and services is distributed among 
individual taxpayers. The taxpayer is equally concerned with the inci-
dence of a.tax because it affects his economic well-being not only 
directly through the income he surrenders, but also indirectly through 
the higher prices of the taxed products he buys. 
Althqugh the importance of tax incidence has long been recognized 
and the theoretical issues involved have been discussed even before the 
days of David Ricardo, 1 empirical research on this subject is only about 
1For a historical review of tax incidence theory, see Edwin R. A. 
Seligman, The Shifting and Incidence of Taxation, 3rd ed. (New York: 
The Columbia University Press, 1910). 
2 
three decades old. 2 Tax incidence.rese~rch on the state·and local level 
is even more recent; .the first empirical results were published in 
1958. 3 More statistical.data on the state and local level are now 
available and empirical research has focused on speciftc taxes. 
Improved data sour~es now-make it possible to investigate empirically 
the incidence,problem in some specific states. 
Two major reasons account for the selection of Montana for this 
inc~dence study. In the first place, there has been no comprehensive 
study of.tax incidence for Montana and s~ch a.study may provide useful 
infqrmation for the legislators and residents of t~at state. In the 
seGond plac~, the author had an opportunity to obt~in data for Montana 
whic.h are frequently not available for a state. 
Scope and Purpose of the Study 
This study examines the tax burden distribution in Montana. The 
demand for public expenditure is.not a.part of the present investiga-
tion. Research into expenditure benefits is equally important but t~is 
study.focuses its attention on tax incidence because the data concerning 
the.distribution of tax bur4en seem to be more reliable than those 
concerning the distributton of expenditure benefits, many people who 
take government_services,for granted tend to be more·concerned with the 
2see, for inst~nce, Robert B. Pettengill, "Division of the Tax 
Burden Among Income Groups in the United States in 1936, 11 American, 
Eccmomic Review, XXX (March, 1940), pp. 60-71, and Helen Tarasov,. 11Who 
Does.Pay the Taxes?" Social Research, Supplement, IV (1942), pp. l--·79. 
3see Richard A. Musgrave and Darwin W. Diacoff, "Who Pays the 
Michigan Taxes?" Michigan Tax Study: Staff Papers (Lansing, Michigan: 
Michigan.Secretary of F:inance; 1958), pp. 131-83~ 
incomes they surrender, and as pointed out by Musgrave and others, 
In expenditure determination, the objective is to render 
certain services and to do so efficiently; the distribution 
effects of public demand for resourGes are secondary. In tax 
determination, the distribution of the money burden is of 
primary importance.4 
The purpose of this study is to find out who, in the final 
analysis, pays how much of the state and local taxes in Montana. 
Inquiries like this would be na-turally associated with people's concern 
, over equity _in taxation. Equity, nevertheless, is mainly a matter of 
value judgment. Having its end as scientific and objective, this study 
will not.attempt to answer the question whether a certain Montana tax 
or the.Montana tax structure as a whole is fair or unfair. However, 
since the whole problem of tax incidence centers around the question of 
tax equality, a few tentative statements on equity can be made pro-
vided that the ability-to-pay principle of taxation is accepted and 
income is used as the index of equality. 
Nature of t~e Problem 
The general problem .of tax incidence is to locate the ultimate 
money burden of a tax or to trace the effect of taxation on individual 
incomes. Since the one who beqrs the final money burden of a tax 
suffers a reduction in his income, these two aspects of t~e problem are 
very much.the same. The m~in problem in.this study, however, can be 
better understood hy pointing out the exact meaning of the terms in 
4 R. A. Musgrave, J. J. Carroll, L. D. Cook, and L. Frane, 
3 
"Distribution of Tax Payments by Income Groups: A Case Study for 1948," 
NationalTax Journal, IV (March, 1951), p. 8. 
' ·--
question, "Who, in the final analysis, pays how much of the Montana 
state and local taxes." 
4 
Traditionally, the term "who" in the question would refer to either 
the capitalist, the landlord, or the worker. In the days of the classi-
cal economists, the discussion 'o_f tax incidenc::e was in terms of inci-
dence on wages, profits, and rents. In modern days, however, there has 
been a growing tendency for people to receive incomes from a variety of 
sources and, ·therefore, ·distinction between various factor shares has 
lost much of its ,previous analytical exactness •. In the meantime, 'it is 
neither feasible nor.necessary to study the incidence of taxes for 
every individual in the state. Therefore, the term 11who 11 is considered 
to represent a group of individuals classified by the size of their 
income received in a year. 
The words "in the final analysis 11 are used to convey the idea that 
for every economic u~it there will usually be a difference between its 
statutory tax :liability and its actual tax liability, and that.in the 
analysis of tax incidence concern is with the latter. An economic unit 
will often adjust to the changed economic conditions as a result of 
taxation. Its income position may become better or worse depending on 
whether or not it can recoup the income surrendered. A producer subject 
to a specific sales tax may recover the tax he pa:ys through an increase 
in the price of the product he sells. A worker liable to the individual 
income tax may change his job to keep the level of his disposable income 
unchanged, In these cases, the initial taxpayers do not finally bear 
the burden of the taxes. 
The terms 11pays how much11 shoulq. be understood in relation to the 
incomes these groups receive. To compare the absolute amount of tax 
5 
payments among income groups, without also comparing incomes they 
receive, is .to a large extent meaningless. Therefore, this study is 
concerned with the tax liability relative to income for different income 
groups. 
11The Montana state and local taxes 11 encompass all the tax revenues 
collected by the state and local governments in Montana during the 
fiscal year 1966-67. 5 Most of the data concerning the collection of 
these taxes can be found in the Census of Governments and State Tax 
Collections published by the U. S. Bureau of the Census. 
Terms and Methods 
The terminology used in most of the empirical studies of tax 
incidence is often confusing. It is necessary, therefore, to define a· 
few important and frequently used terms in this study at the outset. 
11 Tax incidence11 .is defined as a set of the ratios of final tax payments 
to incomes received by income size bracket. When the ratios of this 
set increase for higher income brackets, the incidence of the tax (or 
taxes) is said to be progressive. The higher income groups in this case 
bear a relatively heavier tax burden, in relation to their incomes, than 
the lower income groups. Tax incidence can, likewise, be proportional 
(neutral) or regressive depending upon whether the tax-to-income ratios 
are constant or decreasing as the size of income bracket increases. 
The term 11 tax burden11 is defined in a customary manner as the final 
location of a tax which rests with an individual or a group of individ-
uals and thus causes a reduction in the latter's money income. If tax 
5Individual income tax collections are for the calendar year 1967. 
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incidence is regressive, tax burden distribution concentrates on the 
lower income groups, therefore, these groups bear heavier tax burden 
than other groups. 
Another closely related term is "tax payment distribution." This 
is the absolute amount of taxes collected from each income group without 
comparing these.payments with the incomes received by the group. 
It is evident that the estimation of over-all tax incidence in 
Montana involves the derivation of a measurement of income and the 
estimation of tax payment distribution for each tax by the size of 
income bracket.' The derivation of the measurement of income is chiefly 
a matter of collecting, calculating, extrapolating, and interpolating 
related data. In order to derive distributions of tax payments, tax 
incidence theory must be relied upon in making specific shifting 
assumptions of the various taxes under consideration. 
Limitations 
The modern theory of tax incidence suggests that an empirical 
incidence study would reveal the effect of taxation on the distribution 
of income. Such a result cannot be determined empirically because the 
distribution of income before the imposition of a tax or taxes is not 
6 known. Any measured tax-induced change in income distribution may have 
6Please refer to the theoretical discussion by A. R. Prest, 
"Statistical Calculation of Tax Burden," Economica, N.S., XXII (August, 
1955), pp. 234-45. His main idea is that a hypothetical removal of the 
public sector does not give us the "original" distribution of income 
before the taxation is introduced. See also W. Irwin Gillespie's admit-
tance of the analytical weakness of his own approach in "Effect of 
Public Expenditures on the Distribution of Income, 11 in Richard A. 
Musgrave ed. Essay in Fiscal Federalism (Washington, D. C.: The 
Brookings Institution, 1965), p. 129, and p. 167; and Bent Hansen's 
7 
been due to changes in technology, tastes and preferences or federal 
tax policy. For this reason the present study disregards the effect of 
Montana taxation on the distribution of income. 
Although government transfer payments are included in the 
measurement of income, expenditure benefits are not part of the present 
study. The uses of tax revenue have a significant impact on tax inci-
dence. In the broadest sense, all government expenditure benefits 
received by an individual can be.considered as income (being material 
and psychic) which serve to satisfy his wants, The inclusion of these 
benefits in the denominators of the tax incidence formula would signifi-
cantly change the over-all tax incidence. Without including these 
benefits, for instance, it may be found that the over-,-all tax incidence 
is progressive. With the inclusion of these benefits, the incidence may 
become proportional or even regressive if the higher income groups have 
been benefited more from the government expenditures .than the lower 
income groups. To the e::x;tent that the exclusion of the expenditures 
may distort the true picture of tax incidence, this study must plead 
guilty. 
Another·limitation concerns the statistical data used in this 
study. Though theJ;"e are enough acceptable data available to permit a 
significant study, its empirical results will still depend on the 
reliability of the data. Because of the complexity of .the problem 
involved a variety of sources are·relied upon. These sources are not 
maintenance that "empirical investigations into incidence are 
practically non-existent" in his.The Economic Theory of Fiscal Policy 
(London: George Allen and Unwin, LTD., 1958), pp. 99-100. · 
8 
altogether satisfactory and specific to the State of Montana. Some 
allocative data at the Montana state and local level are not available. 
In .such cases, allocative data on the national level are used. It is 
not unreasonable to assume that consumer behavior (such as cigarette 
smoking, insuranc.e buying), and income-earning patterns (such as 
interest earnings from the holding of U. S.•savings bonds, or sales of 
capital assets) of an average Montana resident follow the pattern found 
for an average·U. S. resident. To the extent that this assumption is 
in error the .results must become more tentative in nature. 
The results of this study depend a great deal on assumptions made 
concerning the shifting of taxes. These assumptions are not derived 
from the empirically verified fac.ts. They are based on theoretical. 
deductive reasoning, .therefore, caution should be taken in interpreting 
the. results of this study. It should be remembered that whether or not· 
the results reflect a fair approximation, to the actual.situation, depends 
to a great extent on the reasonableness of the assumptions on shifting 
of taxes. 
Plan of Presentation 
C~apter II is divided into two .sections. The theory of tax 
incidence is discussed in the first section. The purpose of this dis-
cussdon .is · to set a theoretical background for the empirical part of 
the study. The second , section of Chapter II is. devoted to a discussion 
of the assumptions made concerning shifting the various Montana state 
and local taxes. 
Chapter III deals with the concepts of income and the estimation, 
of income distribution in Montana. In the discussion of income concepts, 
emphasis will be focused on the fact that the use of different income 
concepts can significa1;1tly affect the relative tax burden distribution 
among income groups so that a proper selection of income concept is. 
needed. 
9 
Chapter IV will provide estimates of tax payment distribution for 
the various Montana state and local taxes. Each specific tax collection 
will be derived. or estimated, then these totals will be allocated tq 
eacb income bracket. 
fo. Chapte;- V the over-all and . specific tax incidence of Montana_ 
taxes is obtained. These results are then compared with a few previous 
state tax studies whenever it is feasible. 
CHAPTER II 
THEORETICAL BACKGROUND 
Theory of Tax Incidence 
Traditional Appr?ach 
The traditional partial analysis of the theory of tax incidence was 
developed essentially as an application of neoclassical price theory to 
the field of taxation. 1 The traditional economists defined tax inci-
dence either as the final resting place, or as the ultimate and direct 
2 money burden, of a tax. They used the term "effects" to refer to all 
other indirect income and output changes resulting from taxation. In 
defining terms in this manner, the problem of tax incidence was 
centered around the question of whether a particular tax could be 
shifted from the person who initially paid it to others who did not. 
Since this kind of tax shifting takes place mainly through price 
1 It may be re9alled that the assumptions involved in this partial 
equilibrium theory are: (1) the general level of income remains 
constant; (2) the demand (schedule) for the taxed product does not 
change as a result of the tax; and (3) the relative prices of products 
other than the taxed one do not change. The major assumptions of the 
neoclassical price theory include: (1) the firm tries to maximize 
profits; (2) tastes, resources, and technology are constant; and (3) 
full employment prevails. 
2see, for instance, Hugh Dalton, Principles of Public Finance, 4th 
ed. (New York: Augustus M. Kelley Publishers, 1967 reprint), p. 36; and 
Otto.van Mering, The Shifting and.Incidence of Taxation (Philadelphia: 
TheBl.;i.kiston Company,· 1942), p. 3. 
10 
11 
changes, attention was given to the economic behavior of individuals or 
firms in response to an imposition of a tax. 
For the most part;the traditional neoclassical approach to the 
theory of tax incidence proceeded to explore the effects of taxation on 
the supply side of the market. 3 If a tax causes a decrease in supply 
and an incre~se in price, it is considered to be at least partially 
shifted~ Should the·tax cause no change in supply and price, it rests 
with the initial taxpayer. Under whatever the state of competition, 
for instan9e, the traditional supply analysis has led to the conclusion 
that a general income tax on net profits could not be shifted, so that 
the burden of such a tax falls on the firm. It is argued that a general 
income tax causes no change.in the supply of a commodity. In the first 
place, although the tax will reduce profits, it will not alter the 
relative profitableness of various investment. Thus, there will be no 
transfer of capital in the production of any given product. Addition-, 
ally, a tax levied on profits cannot touch the marginal producer, for. 
he makes no profits. He continues to supply as much as he did before 
the imposition of the tax. Since the supply of a commodity is not. 
changed, its price .remains constant and there will be no mechanism for 
shifting the tax.· 
Tax shifting is, therefore~ ·a rather complicated price phenomenon. 
However, a number of principles concerning the shifting and incidence.of 
3 There are some exceptions like Antonio de Vite de Marco who 
examined the effects on the demand side of the.market; see his First 
Principles of Public Finance, English translation by E. P. Marget 
(London: Jonathan Cape, 1950), Chapter 4 of Book II, especially pp. 
148-65. 
12 
a .tax can be presented. Given the assumptions of full employment and 
profit maximization on the part of the firm, the extent to which a tax 
may be shifted depends upon the following factors: (1) the nature of 
the tax; (2) price elasticities of supply and demand for the taxed 
product and for its factor of production; (3) cost conditions of the 
taxed industry; (4) the market structure and time period in which a firm 
operates; and (5) the influence of a tax on a firm's costs of production 
or profits. 
The nature of a tax has a strong influence on its shiftability. 
Generally speaking, the more direct a tax, the more difficult it is to 
shift. A direct tax usually applies to a tax base close to the 
individual, such as his income a~d wealth. Due to the lack of a 
further market transaction after taxation, it is difficult for the tax-
payer to pass the burden onto someone else through a change in prices 
or in services supplied. On the other hand, an indirect tax such as a 
retail sales tax offers a better opportunity of being shifted because 
the taxed product will be sold after the tax is levied. 
A broad-based tax is usually easier to shift than a narrow-based 
tax. A narrow-based tax on a certain commodity may cause the consumer 
to demand some other untaxed product as a substitute if the seller 
increases the price of the.taxed commodity. Since the seller finds it 
difficult to raise the price he has to bear the burden of the tax. A 
broad-based tax.on all products, however, would reduce the opportunity 
for consumers to find an untaxed substitute. In this case, the sellers 
of the taxed products have .a better chance to increase prices and 
thereby pass on at least a part of the tax burden to consumers. 
13 
If consumers' demand for a taxed commodity is price inelastic, the 
firm can raise the price of the taxed commodity and shift the tax 
forward in whole or in part to the consumer. If, however, the demand 
is price elastic, an increase in product price, which is needed to cover 
the tax, would cause the consumer to reduce consumption and, therefore, 
the tax is difficult to shift. In general, the more inelastic th~ 
demand for a product in response to a change in the price, the greater 
is the possibility of tax shifting. Similarly, the more inelastic the 
supply of the taxed product, the less likely the burden would be shifted 
to others either by a rise in price or by a reduction in supply. 
The above statement of price elasticity concerns the demand and 
supply condition in the product marke.t. The position of a resource 
owner in the factor market is determined by the elasticity of supply of 
the factor. If the supply of a factor is inelastic, the firm would be 
able to lower its factor-demand price (cost) so that the tax could be 
shifted backward to the resource owner. On the other hand, if the 
factor supply is price elastic, the firm may have to bear the burden of 
the tax. When the firm tries to buy these factors at a lower price, the 
quantity supplied would drop. In general, the more inelastic the factor· 
supplied, the greater is the opportunity for tax shifting. 
Cost.conditions of the taxed industry can also significantly 
affect a firm's ability to shift the tax. This point will be illus-
trated by assuming that a unit taxi~ imposed on the output of the firms 
operating under pure competition in the long run. The impact of this 
14 
tax will then be examined under conditions of increasing, decreasing and 
constant costs. 
An increasing cost industry is the one in which the entry of new 
firms wi~l, because of the increase 'in resource prices, drive the.whole 
set pf cost curves of existing firms upward. The exit of existing firms 
in such an industry will, therefore, shift the cost.curves of the 
remaining firms downward. A unit tax which increases the .costs per unit. 
of output for all firms in the .industry would generally force the firms 
to drive price upward to the amount of the tax. However, because of the 
tax'"".'induced increase in costs after the imposition of the tax, some 
high-cost marginal firms are forced to.leave the industry. Industry 
output will decline. The declining output causes the .industry's total 
demand for resources to fall. Res·ource prices · are then dropped. This 
will decrease the costs (which are net or exclusive of the tax) of 
production for all firms in the industry and offset the initial tendency. 
of price rise brought about by the.imposition of the tax. Equilibrium 
for the.remaining firms in the industry will be reestablished by a 
price rise which .is les,s than·t'he amount of the .tax. The unit ta,x in 
this case is, therefore, partially shifted. 
Re~s©ning along similar lines, it can be·maintained that in a 
constant cost inq.ustry, price will rise by the amount of the .tax. 
Therefore; the unit tax is fully shifted fprward to the consumer. In a 
decreasing cost industry, however, the increase in price will be greater 
4 than the amount of the. tax; .it is thus more than fully shifted. 
4 Harold M. Groves expresses doubts concerning this kind of tax 
shifting. He believes that decreasing costs are usually the result of 
c4anges in population, technology, or resources, not the result of the 
expansion of output. These reasons for decreasing costs do not 
15 
Other fac.tors determining shiftability of a tax are the market 
structure and time period in which a firm operates.· These factors will 
be discussed. by assuming an imposition of a unit tax on firms which 
operate under different market structures and time periods. 
Under pure competition, none of the tax could be shifted in the 
very short run since no single firm could alter the competitive price. 
In the short run, the situation is somewhat different. The unit tax 
increases the average and marginal costs of the firms so that the firm 
would want to sell the product at a higher price. Since the individual 
firm is still a price-taker, it would not be able to increase the price 
in response to the tax imposition. The firm may, however, reduce out-
put; total industry output would also drop because high cost firms drop 
out~ This curtailment of industry output may cause the price to rise, 
but the amount of price increase would usually not be able to cover the 
tax. Moreover, in the short run the firm would continue to produce as 
long as .the marginal revenue (price) can cover the variable costs. It 
is generally believed, therefore, th1;1t firms under pure competition in 
the .short run would bear some burden of a unit tax. In the long run, 
more marginal firms would leave the industry. The reduction in industry 
output coulcl. raise the.price enough for each firm to cover the tax. The 
extent to which the tax may be shifted depends on the long run cost 
conditi.ons, of the taxed industry, which was noted before. 
In the short run, as in the case of pure competition, the 
monopolistic competitive firms may have to .ab'sorb the tax, even though 
disappear because of the tax. Therefore, the increase in product price 
after the tax cannot be greater than the amount of the tax. See 
Financing Government, 4th ed. (New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1954), 
pp. 112-13. 
16 
product differentiation could allow some shi~ting. In the long run, the 
exit of some firms, because of rising costs after taxation, may reduce 
the industry output to the extent that the increase in price could fully 
cover the tax.. The tax is thus shifted forward to the consumer. 
A unit tax imposed on the output of a monopolist drives his 
marginal and average costs upward. For profit maximization in the short 
run he will raise the price and reduce the output. In this way, at 
least a part of the tax will be shifted forward to the consumer. The 
long run shift~ng of a unit tax will depend upon the monopolist's long 
run cost .conditions. Like the case under pure competition, the greatest 
price rise (hence the amount of tax shifting) occurs with decreasing 
costs, the next to the greatest price rise with constant costs, and the. 
smallest price rise with increasing costs. However, the increase in 
price .under monopoly will fall short of the amount of the tax for both 
constant and increasing costs; .and. it may fall short of,. or exceed, the, 
tax for decreasing costs. These results--which differ from those of 
pure competition--are essentially due to the fact that a portion of the 
tax is absorbed by the reduction of .the monopolist's profits and the 
amount of the reduction may not be the same under various cost 
conditions. 
The reaction of an oligopolist following the imposition of a unit 
tax would,depend upon the behavior of his competitors, which to a great 
extent also determines his ability to shift the tax. The oligopolist 
would probably increase the price to the full amount of the tax if he 
believes that the others would do the same. A tax serves as an excuse 
to adjust prices in this case. However, the oligopolists may not 
increase the price after the taxation and bear a partial or full burden 
17 
of the tax. This will be the .case particularly when the tax-induced 
change.of the marginal cost does not alter .the profit maximization price 
level under the situation of an oligopoly gap where a kinked demand 
curve exists. In the long run, the possibility of tax shifting under 
oligopoly resembles that under monopoly. 
Another important factor determining shiftability of a tax is 
whether the tax influences a firm's costs or profits. If a tax affects 
a firm's variable costs, it is most likely to be shifted even in the 
short run. A tax.which influences the fixed cost$ of the firm is not 
likely to be shifted in the short run, but will be shifted in the long 
run. If only excess (economic) profits are influenced by the tax, it is 
usually not.shifted. This is the case because the tax does not·change 
the firm's profit maximization position. However, a part of the tax 
will be shifted if it imposes on profits as defined by an accountant; 
this definition of profit usually includes such cost items as imputed 
f d ' 1 d d f 'k k' S wages o management, rent on owne capita, an rewar orris -ta ing. 
The preceding analysis of tax shifting concerns essentially a tax 
imposed on business firms. A few other factors must be .considered in 
dealing with shifting of a tax which is imposed on individuals. Given 
th~ assumption o~ rational behavior on the part of the individual, the 
extent to which a tax (on income, consumption, or wealth) may be shifted 
5 In the previous discussion of several shifting factors such as 
cost condition, market structure, ~nd time period, some general 
principles were establish.ed with respect to the shiftability of a tax. 
At that time, a unit tax on output was assumed throughout the discus-
sion. It appears clear now that if other kinds of taxes such as 
profit tax and lump sum tax were assumed, conclusions made therein 
concerning the shifting of a tax would have to be modified in on.e way 
or an()ther. 
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depends primarily upon the preference patterns of the individual--
preference between income and leisure, between present and future con-
sumption (or accumulation), between leisure and consumption, between 
holding cash and holding assets, and/or preference between living in one 
political jurisdiction or another. A tax on individuals' interest 
income, for instance, will likely be shifted if it changes their prefer-
ence pattern so that more present consumption is preferred than either 
future consumption or accumulation. The changed preference in this case 
will reduce th~ supply of money capital and bring about an increase in 
interest rates. Therefore, the tax is shifted forward to the borrower 
of the loanable funds. Similarly, a tax on work income will be shifted 
if it causes individuals to prefer more leisure so that wages rise as a 
consequence of the reduction in the supply of labor. 
Not all the above several factors are equally important in deter-
mining the shiftability of a particular tax (imposed on firms or on 
individuals). In reality, one factor may be more important than the 
others, depending upon the kind of tax under consideration. Also, 
other factors not yet mentioned and which do not conceptually fit into 
the traditional supply analysis may have to be accounted for. These 
factors include: (1) whether it is a large or a small political 
jurisdiction that imposes the tax; (2) whether the tax is of an open or 
a hidden nature; (3) whether the tax is paid through withholdings or by 
direct assessment; and (4) whether or not the government regulates 
prices and factor earnings. 
In addition, it should be noted that when the assumptions of full 
employment, profit and utility maximization are relaxed, all the above 
mentioned shifting factors would have to be qualified. For instance, 
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it has been argued that many firms do not attempt to achieve profit 
maximization positions. Therefore, these firms have "unrealized gains" 
--i.e., the.amount of incremental profits (or of reduced losses) which 
could be .o-btained if the firms were operating at a profit-maximizing 
level instead of tl).eir actual positions. A tax on net profits of these 
firms would give them the incentive to raise the prices of products so 
as to move closer to the profit-maximizing position. In this way, the 
tax could. be shifted forward to consumers--a· conclusion that is contrary 
to.the 'one under the assumption of profit maximization. 
Modern Approach 
The traditional theory of tax incidence has been criticized by 
modern writers such as Bent Hansen, Richard A. Musgrave, and Osmo V. 
Jaskari. 6 They point out that there are several major difficulties 
associated with the partial equilibrium approach. First, the distinc-
tion between direct incidence and indirect effects of a tax is 
arbitrary 9 because in a general equilibrium system these changes are all 
part of the .. total adjustment and cannot be separately identified. 
Second, the concept of incidence.as the ultimate burden of a tax 
starts from the false premise that any tax eventually involves a trans-
fer of goods and services from the private to the public sector. In 
fact, taxes may be imposed, removed, and substituted for each other 
without involving resource transfers from the private to the public 
sector. 
6Hansen, pp. 90-98; Richard A. Musgrave, The Theory of Public 
Finance (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1959), pp. 227-31; Osmo V. 
Jaskari, A Study in the Theory £i Incidence £i Taxation (Helsinki, 
Finland: Finnish Academy of Sciences, 1961), pp. 10-2i. 
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Third, too little attention has been given to the expenditure side 
of the budget even though the use of tax revenues has a significant 
influence on the shifting of a tax. For example, government expendi-
tures which are financed by an output tax on certain products may pro-
vide cost-saving benefits to business firms. In this way, instead of an 
increase in prices after the imposition of the tax, prices may remain 
constant so that shifting does not occur as it does in the partial 
analysis. 
Fourth, if partial equilibrium is appliedcto the demand side of the 
market, conflicting conclusions on tax shifting may be reached. For 
instance, the supply analysis has led to the conclusion that a general 
income tax on net profits cannot be shifted. However, the demand 
analysis would show that this is only one of several possible cases. 
A general income tax on net profits will reduce dividend income of 
individuals. Since this income is not evenly distributed among all 
income groups, the tax woulq cause the demand pattern of individuals to 
change. Demand for certain products may be increased while others 
reduced. Those firms whose demand is increased will be able to raise 
prices so that the profit tax can be shifted forward to the consumer. 
The difficulties of a partial equilibrium approach to tax incidence 
have caused modern writers to formulate the theory in a general 
equilibrium framework. 7 This approach is most clearly outlined by 
7This statement does not imply that there was no attempt by both 
the classical and neoclassical economists tq develop a general theory of 
tax incidence. David Ricardo, Knut Wicksell, Leon Walras, and others 
made such an attempt, but they did not succeed in formulating the theory 
in a clear and unambiguous manner. Moreover, though modern writers have 
criticized the traditional partial theory, it should not be implied that 
th~y do not use the partial approach. Please refer to Musgrave, pp. 
385-401. 
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Musgrave.a Musgrave observes the economic consequencee of a change in 
budget policy in an economy, and describes the result under three cate-
gories: (1) resource transfer--resources are transferred from private 
to public use or from public to private use; .(2) incidence--the change 
in distril?ution of income; (3) output effects--possible change in the 
lev~l of output or real income. Budget incidence is viewed as one of 
the .effects of a change in budget policy, which can be caused by changes 
in taxes and/or expenditures. Tax incidence is therefore defined as the 
change in the distribution of income as a result of a change in tax 
policy. A.change in tax policy refers either to a change in tax rates 
(specific tax incidence) or the substitution of one tax for another 
assuming equal yields for both (differential tax incidence). 
According to Musgrave and others, notably Carl S. Shoup, the 
9 concept of differential incidence·is of great significance.· This con-
cept allows for the existence of a public sector _in the beginning, which 
is necessary in a general equilibrium framework. Differential incidence 
also has the advantage of not being inherently associated with an infla-
tion or deflation process found_ in the concept of specific tax inci-
dence. This advantage-is important, because if a chnage in tax policy 
results .in inflation or deflation, the recorded final distribution of 
income would not only be the _result of the tax change, but also of the 
inflation or deflatio~ process. The differential concept also implies 
that different taxes of the same yield may result in different 
8 Musgrave, Chapters 10, 15, and 16. 
9 Carl S. Shoup, Public Finance (Chicago: - Aldine Publishing 
Company, 1969). 
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distributions of income available for private use. Furthermore, a 
change in tax policy does not have to increase the "total" economic 
burden to the private sector if the real expenditures are held constant. 
Musgrave's approach to the theory of tax incidence deals 
essentially with the change in relative income of individuals or groups 
of individuals as a result of tax policy. He spells out clearly how 
individual incomes are affected by various taxes under different market 
structures in both product and factor markets and for both classical 
and Keynesian systems. Instead of tracing the final burden of a tax, 
a study of tax incidence will answer the question whether the incidence 
is neutral (leaving the income distribution unchanged), progressive 
(causing income distribution to change in favor of lower income recipi-
ents or groups), or regressive (shifting the after-tax income distribu-
tion in favor of higher income recipients). 
"The crux of incidence analysis, in the general equilibrium context 
lies in determining whether, and in what respect, any given tax is 
1 d . . . ..10 genera or 1scr1m1natory. In the general equilibrium setting, a 
general tax, which applies to all the,. transactions on either the buyer's 
or the seller's side of the market, would in principle not alter the 
relative prices of products and of factors of production. The incidence 
of a general tax would thus be neutral because unchanged relative prices 
after the tax would leave the size distribution of income unchanged. 
A discriminatory tax, which applies to certain transcations only, will 
cause the relative factor and product prices to change. The incidence 
10 Musgrave, p. 348. 
of a discriminatory tax will, therefore, be either progressive or 
regressive. 
The modern theoretical concept of tax incidence is of special 
interest to anyone who wants to measure the different result in income 
distribution between two alternative tax measures. As a practical 
measure, however, it is difficult to determine the effects of tax 
policies on the relative income positions of individuals or specific 
income groups. Any change in income distribution that is observed may 
be caused by changes in tax policies or by other influences whose 
effects cannot be determined from the data. 11 Therefore, the opera-
tional definition of tax incidence as a set of the ratios of final tax 
payments to imccimes received by income size bracket must be relied upon 
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in this empirical study. Partial equilibrium analysis is relied upon in 
order to make assumptions concerning the shifting of Montana taxes while 
at the same time the modern emphasis on income distribution is not 
neglected. The role of the general and partial equilibrium theory in an 
empirical tax incidence study can be elucidated in the following 
quotation: 
If the full fruitfulness of general equilibrium analysis, or 
for that matter flow of funds accounting, input-output 
analysis, and so on, is to be realized in actual policy making 
and t~x reforms, sufficient _empirical con.tent must be added to 
convince "practical" businessmen and politicians of the cor-
rectness of the predictions of incidence and effects. An 
expositio~ based on logiGal consistency alone may never be 
able to prevail over pragmatic and anti-theoretic prejudices. 
Conventional partial equilibrium tax incidence theory does 
contain operational. concepts. It is phrased in business 
language so that when revenue is needed for a specific project 
11Hence, even Musgrave himself admits that his calculation of 
differential tax incidence "is little more than a gesture of respect to 
our conceptual discussion." See Musgrave, Carroll, Cook, and Frane, p. 
10. 
in a specific institutional setting a convincing picture of 
the distribution of the burden can be drawn with some con-
fidence and some public acceptance. This same degree of 
acceptance on part of the citizen has not been won by the 
more abstract theories and may never be won until more evi-
dence from within the realm of experience can be brought to 
bear upon predictions for specific tax problems,12 (Italics 
mine.) 
Specific Shifting Assumptions 
If several factors are weighted heavily toward the shifting of a 
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particular tax, it is concluded that the tax will be shifted. A tax is 
most likely to be shifted if (1) it is indirect and broad-based; (2) 
the taxed firm operates under pure competition in the long run; (3) the 
costs of the taxed industry are constant or decreasing; (4) demand for 
the taxed product is inelastic while the supply of it is elastic; (5) 
the tax applies to a wide political jurisdiction; (6) the firm has 
unrealized gains before the imposition of the tax; (7) the tax 
significantly affects the.cost of production of the firm; (8) the tax 
changes individuals' preferences so that supply of labor and/or funds 
are reduced; (9) the tax is of an open nature and is collected by direct 
assessment; and (10) the tax is imposed on firms of a monopolistic 
nature whose pricing policies are regulated by governmental agencies. 
In making the following shifting assumptions concerning Montana 
state and local taxes, however, the consideration of the above factors 
may not be sufficient and applicable. 13 Therefore, it will be necessary 
12Robert P. Collier, "Some Empirical Evidence of Tax Incidence," 
National Tax Journal, XI (March, 1958), p. 55. 
13some factors are not applicable from an empirical.point of view. 
For instance, the corporation income tax is levied on all corporations 
under whatever state of competition, Since data are not available for 
the collection of the _tax from corporations classified under each of the 
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to refer to the practices and findings of existing empirical studies as 
well as to rely on some personal judgments. 
Individual Income Tax 
This tax is direct and broad-based and is applied to every income 
recipient in the state (a large political jurisdiction). Under the 
prevailing institutional arrangements--which prevent a person from 
freely combining leisure and work--a person cannot change the length of 
the work week because of a tax change. The supply of labor would change 
14 very slightly after the tax is changed. Moreover, there is not 
enough empirical knowledge to determine the actual direction and extent 
of changes in labor supply. Likewise, there is no empirical evidence 
with regard to individuals' change of preference after a tax is levied. 
It is reasonable to assume, therefore, that the individual income tax 
does not affect either the supply of labor or supply of funds. Under 
conditions of full employment the partial monopoly of licensed profes-
sions and labor unions may increase fees and raise wages through callee-
tive bargaining; however, the amount and direction of such tax shifting 
is still largely unknown. Therefore, it is assumed that the individual 
income tax burden is borne by income recipients or taxpayers in the 
form of lower net income. 
four market structures, it is impossible to consider the market 
structure as a factor in determining the shifting of the Montana corpor-
ation income tax. 
14see, for instance, Marvin Kosters, "Effects of an Income Tax on 
Labor Supply,"·in Arnold C. Harberger and Martin J, Bailey ed., The 
Taxation of Income from Capital (Washington, D. C.: The Brookings 
Institution, 1969), pp, 301-24. 
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Corporation Income Tax 
The traditional partial equilibrium analysis has led most 
economists to believe that the corporation income tax is not shifted and 
therefore its burden is borne by the firm or by its owners (dividend 
receivers). Since the tax is imposed on net income, it has no effect 
on a corporation's costs of production and profit maximization position. 
Moreover, the tax is direct and broad-based. 
Owing partly to empirical findings and partly to theoretical con-
tent ions, modern writers on this subject have ql\_estioned these conclu-
sions. Carl S. Shoup, for instance, has argued that at least a part 
of the corporation income tax will be shifted forward when the tax is 
imposed on a corporation that 11has a large proportion of its taxable 
income earmarked for preferred dividends, with none of its operating 
profit going to interest or rentals, and with a low turnover rate" 
f h d i h b ' lS K ' k d M ' o t e property use n t e us1ness. rzyzania an usgrave, using 
statistical data for the years 1935 to 1942 and 1948 to 1959, have 
15carl S. Shoup, "Incidence of the Corporation Income Tax: Capital 
Structtire and Turnover Rates," National Tax Journal, I (March, 1948), p. 
17; see also "Some Considerations on the Incidence of the Corporation 
Income Tax," Journal of Finance, VI (June, 1951), pp. 188-96. Besides 
Shoup, other writers arguing the.shifting of a portion of the tax 
include: (1) Richard Goode, The Corporation Income Tax (New York: 
John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 1951), and "Rates of Return, Income Shares, 
and Corporate Tax. Incidence," in Marian Krzyzaniak, ed. Effects £1 
Corporation Income Tax (Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 1966), 
pp. 207-46; (2) Eugene M. Lerner and Eldon S. Hendriksen, "Federal 
Taxes on Corporation Income and the Rate of Return on Investment in 
Manufacturing, 1927 to 1952.," National Tax Journal, IX (Sept~mber, 
1956), pp. 193-202; (3) Don M. Soule, "Shifting of the Corporation 
Income Tax: A Dymimic Analysis," Journal of Finance, XIV (September, 
1959), pp. 390-402; and (4) Marian Krzyzaniak, "Effects of Profit 
Taxes: Deduced from Neoclassical Growth Models," in Krzyzaniak, ed. , 
pp. 17-106. 
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estimated the effect of changes in the corporation income tax rate upon 
the gross rate of return to capital in the corporate sector. They came 
to the conclusion that the corporation income tax was probably shifted 
by more than 100 percent--i.e., the owners of capital actually gain 
1 f i . h i . 16 as a resu to a r se int e corporat on income tax. They believe 
that this conclusion was probably due to the fact that, instead of wait-
ing for the working of market forces such as the flow of investment, the 
corporation, through the conscious decisions of management, would 
increase prices immediately after an imposition or a rise in rates of 
the corporation income tax. 
In contrast to these writers, others maintain that the corporation 
income tax is not shifted. Arnold C. Harberger, for instance, developed 
a general equilibrium model of a two- sector (corporate and non-corpo-
rate) economy, in which the corporation income tax was viewed as a tax 
on the use of capital in the corporate sector. In this model, the 
incidence of the corporation income tax was shown to depend critically 
on three elasticities of substitution: (1) substitution between the 
products of the two sectors; (2) substitution between labor and capital 
in the production of the product in the corporate sector; (3) substitu-
tion between labor and capital in the production of the product in the 
non-corporate sector. Then, by applying a range of plausible values to 
these three elasticities, Harberger determined that in the long run the 
plausible range for capital's share of the total corporation income 
16Marian Krzyzaniak and Richard A. Musgrave, The Shifting of the 
Corporation Income Tax (Baltimore: The John Hopkins University Press, 
1963); see also comments on their findings in Richard E. Slitor, 
"Corporate Tax Incidence: Economic Adjustments to Differentials Under a 
Two-Tier Tax Structure," in Krzyzaniak, ed., pp. 136-206. 
tax burden rested between 90 and 120 percent. 17 In addition, Cragg, 
Harberger, and Mieszkowski have challenged the conclusion drawn by 
18 Krzyzaniak and Musgrave. By introducing the two additional explan-
atory variables (an employment rate and a war-time dummy variable) in 
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the regression equations used by Krzyzaniak and Musgrave, they concluded 
that capital owners would bear approximately 100 percent of the burden 
of the corporation income tax. 
Although all the above mentioned studies center around the issue 
of shifting of .the federal, not of the state, corporation income tax, 
it is believed that the conclusions are also valid for the Montana cor-
poration income tax. In this study, like other studies of this nature, 
both extremes and a middle position will be considered by making three 
alternative shifting assumptions: (1) the tax is not shifted and the 
burden is entirely on the dividend receiver or firm; (2) the tax is 
shifted forward to consumers; and (3) its burden is evenly shared 
b d . 'd d ' d 19 etween 1v1 en receivers an consumers. 
Property Tax 
Because of the variety of properties subject to tax, it would be in 
error to treat this tax as only one tax and to discuss the shifting of 
17Arnold C. Harberger, "The Incidence of the Corporation Income 
Tax," Journal of Political Economy, LXX (June, 1962), pp. 215-40. 
18John C. Cragg, Arnold C. Harberger, and Peter Mieskowski, 
"Empirical Evidence on the Incidence of the Corporation Income Tax," 
Journal of Political Economy, LXXV (December, 1967), pp. 811-21. 
19The possibility of backward shifting to wage earners is not con-
sidered, not because it is not plausible, but because the result would 
differ little from the case of forward shifting to consumers. This is 
so, because empirically the percentage distribution of wages and sala-
ries by income brackets is very similar to that of consumption 
expenditures. 
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"the" property tax as such. For this reason, it is necessary to make 
shifting assumptions according to the type of property taxed. The total 
property tax yield could be divided into real and personal property 
taxes. The latter can further be subdivided by ownership and considered 
separately as taxes on households, businesses, and farmers. 
Property tax on household residential real property--and for that 
matter all real property tax--essentially consists of two parts: taxes 
on the value of land and on the value of improvements. According to 
traditional incidence theory, a tax on land values cannot be shifted 
because the supply of land is perfectly inelastic and the land itself is 
indestructible. The tax, nevertheless, will reduce the attractiveness 
of investment in land as compared to other assets; therefore, land 
prices will fall, and the tax will be capitalized. The question of tax 
capitalization is, however, irrelevant in the study of tax incidence by 
income brackets. The reduced value of land will still be borne by the 
owners of land even if the land is transferred and the tax capita.lized. 
In other words, the distribution of final property tax payments by 
income brackets will not change. Consequently, it is reasonable to 
assume that the household real property tax on land rests with home 
owners. 
Likewise, it is tenable to assume that the tax on the value of 
improvements occupied by owners rests with the owner. Unlike the case 
of taxing land, this assumption is essentially based on the fact that 
even though an individual can move out of the tax jurisdiction or reduce 
the value of. improvements, it is not likely to be true for all 
property owners as a group. This is the case, because the tax is 
imposed in all counties and states, which greatly reduces the 
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opportunity of shifting. Moreover, the tax is direct; and there is no 
price transactton mechanism to enable the owner-occupant to shift the 
tax. 
The above conclusion is changed in the case of renter-occupied real 
property. In this case, shifting the tax from owners to renters is 
20 relatively easy. In order to see how this shifting takes place, 
assume that a property tax is imposed where one did not previously 
exist. The tax will increase costs of producing housing services and 
discourage investment in land and improvements. The reduced supply of 
capital assets in the housing industry would cause the prices of obtain-
ing housing services (rent) to rise regardless of the fact that higher 
rates of interest lead to some substitution of labor for capital. 
Through higher rental rates, the tax is shifted to the renter. 21 
Additionally, demand for housing in general is relatively price 
inelastic, and there is a price mechanism available for the owners of 
20The traditional distinction between taxes on land and improve-
ments is not made in this and the following discussions of real property 
tax shifting. In almost every case, such distinction is both theoreti-
cally and empirically impossible. Please refer to Dick Netzer, 
Economics o~ the Property Tax (Washington, D. C.: The Brookings 
Institution, 1966), p. 35, pp. 211-12. 
21some qualifications will have to be.made when a general 
equilibrium analysis is applied to the shifting of the tax in this case. 
As Dick Netzer points out, factors such as the effects of transfers of 
resources from the housiI).g industry to other untaxed industries have to 
be considered. The increase in the supply of resources in other 
industries reduces the prices of their products. This will benefit 
the renters and offset. their losses ·due to forward shifting of the tax 
(see Netzer, pp. 36-46). In ·the present study, however, such benefits 
are disregarded because the extent of these benefits are unknown and 
because all the assumptions made are in a partial equilibrium setting. 
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the houses to shift taxes to their tenants. The tax on renter"'.'occupied 
real property will be, therefore, assumed to rest on the renter. 
The case for shifting real property taxes levied on business firms 
is very similar to the situation of a renter. Firms are able to pass 
the tax to consumers through market transactions. However, due to out-
of-state competition, the demand for goods produced in Montana is not as 
inelastic as the demand for rental housing. For this reason, the tax on 
business real property is assumed to rest evenly on the owner of the 
property and on the consumer. 
The only difference between taxing business and farm real estate 
is the degree of competition in farming. The owner of farm land 
typically has no influence on the price of the product he sells and can-
not shift a tax forward. Montana is not primarily a state exporting 
farm products. There is strong competition in farm markets from 
neighboring states and all other farming states in the nation. There-
fore, it is assumed that three-fourths of the tax rests with farmers 
and the rest is passed on to the consumer. 
It is generally agreed that taxes on hqusehold personal properties 
(consumer durables) are not shifted. These properties are held for use 
and not for sale, nor are there any close substitutes for them. Many 
of these items are considered necessities, demanded jointly with real 
property, and relatively price inelastic. Therefore, it is reasonable 
to assume that the tax rests with the property owner. 
A tax on business personal properties (producer durables) is a cost 
of production for the firm. It has the similar impact as the tax on 
real business property. However, since personal property is easily 
moved an4 closely related to the volume of production; it would be 
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easier .to shift than the tax on real property. It ·is assumed that the · 
tax on business personal proper,ty is shifted fully to the consumer. 
The tax on farm personal property can be treated just like the case 
of taxing business personal property. Howeve,r, personal property on 
many farms is also owned for the:final con~umption purposes. Therefore; 
it is assumed that one half of the tax is shifted to consumers and the 
other half rests with the owner. 
Highway User Tax 
The highway user tax consists of (1) motor fuel.tax; .(2) motor 
vehicle license tax; and (3) motor vehicle operator's license tax. The 
incidence of the operator's license tax is easy to determine. The tax 
is directly imposed on the operator. As long as he wants to.operate 
a motor vehicle, he cannot shift the tax .since he cannot transfer his 
license. His decision concerning the operation of a vehicle wo~ld 
probably not be affected by the amount of tax.he pays because in most 
cases transportation by means of private cars is a necessity in the 
United States •. Moreover, the tax is imposed in every state of the 
nation: the.possibility of obtaining a license free of charge is 
ruled out. Therefore, it is as.sumed that the operator bears the burden 
of this tax. 
In the case of the motor fuel and motor vehicle license taxes, it 
is necessary to distinguish between the portion paid by households, 
business firms and.farmers. With respect to the portion paid by house-
holds, the.burden is assumed to rest with the direct user and owner, 
because there is no fu:i;-ther market t:i:;ansaction after the taxes are paid 
by.households. The business and farm portion of the tax enters into the 
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cost of production and is assumed to be shifted forward to consumers. 
Alcoholic Beverage and Cigarette Taxes 
Although _the taxes (both excise and license parts) are collected 
from retailers, they are universally believed to rest with the.consumer 
of these products because demand for alcoholic beverages and cigarettes 
is.highly price inelastic-;--since drinking and smoking are essentially 
a matter of habit, the taxes are imposed in every city and state, and 
the.market for these products is monopolistic~competitive. Therefore; 
it is assumed that these taxes are borne entirely by the consumer. 
Insurance Premiums.Tax 
Insurance companies pay a tax of 2.5 percent of gross premium 
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incomes collected .in Mqntana. It is believed that this tax is shifted 
to ·the policy-bolder because the demand for insurance is rather price-
inelastic. Concerning life.and property insurance, the.purchaser is 
motivated,more.by the consideration of _future security, by the.salesman-
ship, and by the mortgage and loan requirements than the change in a 
few percent of the premium paid. Liability insurance is bought mainly 
to comply with the financial responsibility laws (in addition to the 
owner's protection). Furthermore, a tax on gross premiums becomes a 
cost.item.for the insurer which leads him to charge a higher premium. 
This is based on two reasons. Firstly, insurance premium rates charged 
22 The term "gross" is used to mean that the operating costs of 
insurance companies are not deducted in the calculation of tax base. 
One may .use.the term 11net 11 tq mean that cancellations, returns premiums, 
refunds to industrial policyholders, and saving coupons are deducted 
from total premium income. 
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to policy-holders are regulated. The regulation is originally for the 
purpose of preventing insurers from charging excessive and unfair 
discriminatory rates. But, it also renders a reasonable return to them 
because a well-developed insurance industry is clearly beneficial to the 
general public. Secondly, in Montana the premium tax is deductible when 
the insurer meets certain requirements. One such requirement is that!' 
the insurer has 50 percent or more of its capital stock invested in 
Montana securities. 
Public Utility Taxes 
Tax experts in general agree that taxes on public utilities are 
fully shifted forward to the consumer of utility services. Two reasons 
account fo~ this contention. Demand for public utilities is considered 
• 
to be price-inelastic, especially for such services as electric energy, 
natural gas, telephone and telegraph. The utility industries are 
subject to government regulations. Utility rates are set to cover 
business expenses, including taxes, and provide a reasonable rate of 
return on investment. It is assumed, therefore, that the consumer of 
utility services bears the entire burden of the taxes. 
Inheritance and Estate Taxes 
Since these taxes are direct and the transfer of the estate does 
not involve any form of price transaction, the taxes cannot be shifted. 
In general, the burden of the taxes is therefore upon the beneficia-
ries--the people who receive the wealth. Most writers, nevertheless, 
point out the possibility that the deceased rather than the beneficiary 
bears the burden. This happens when the deceased attempts to build up 
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a certain fixed amount of after-tax estate value for his beneficiaries, 
and 11 sacrifices11 more during his lifetime than would have been the case 
without the tax. From the empirical point of view, however, the 
11amount 11 of theEie sacrifices is unknown. Therefore, in this study, it 
is assumed that these taxes are all borne by the beneficiaries. 
Severance Taxes 
These are tax~s imposed on the removal of natural products--e.g., 
oil, gas, minerals, timber, etc.,--from land or water and measured by 
value of quantity of products removed or sold, In 1967, Montana levied 
a tax of 2 to 2.5 percent on the tqtal value of the petroleum produced. 
The gross value is the value of the petrol·eum at the .well head. Other 
natural products subject to taxation include metals, coal, vermiculite 
(micaceous minerals), and cement. Since these taxes are either based on 
the gross value of production or a fixed amount per unit of output, they 
can easily affect the.cost of production of the firm. Therefore, it 
is reasonable to assume that these taxes are shifted forward to consum-
ers because demand fo~ these products is rather price~inelastic. How-
ever, it haEi been argued that small producers of these natural products, 
notably oil producers, who are unable to raise prices charged to large 
refiners, virtually bear all the burden of the tax. This consideration 
woulcj. justify an alternative assumption, which attributes one half of 
23 the tax burden to the producer. 
23since the distr_ibution of income of these small producers may be 
quite similar to th~ distribution of consumption expenditures by income 
bracket, empirically these two assumptions are considered to be the same 
later in the estimation of final tax payments distribution in t~e 
present study. 
36 
Hunting and Fishing License Taxes 
Hunting.and fishing lic;.ense taxes are assumed to be borne entirely 
by the license holder for the following reasons: (1) it is a direct .tax 
and there is no further price trans.action by means of transferring the 
license; (2) the.demand for the license. is price-inelastic because other 
factors such as leisure time, sporting equipment, current income.and 
perso~al tastes are more important in determining the demand for 
licenses. 
Business License·apd.Other Taxes 
These taxes include livestocks and grain inspection fees, chain 
store license tax, physician and dentis.t license fees, and all other 
miscellaneous fees and license charges. It is generally .believed that. 
many of these license taxes are considered to be.costs of doing business 
and could.be passed onto the consu~er. It is assumed, therefore, that 
one half of these taxes is shifted forward to the consumer.and the 
other half rests with the business firms. 
Assumptions on Tax Expert and.Import 
The above discussion of various specific shifting assumptions.has 
implicitly suggested that the possibility of "tax exporting" from 
Montc;1.na tq other·states is not a matter of concern in the present 
24 study. · In earlier state tax studies. the amount of state and local 
24 . 
Tax exporting may be defined as the amount·of Montana state and 
local taxes that can'be ascribed as being borne.by residents outside 
Montana. · Charles e. McLure, Jr •. , however, define~ the term as 11the 
taxes that are shifted to out-of,-state residents was estimated. 
Musgrave and Daicof{ found that a little over 70 percent of Michigan 
25 taxes were actually borne by Michigan taxpayers. Brownlee concluded 
that almost one third of Minnesota state and local tax collections are 
b b 'd 26 orne y non-resi ents. Similarly, Groves and Knight estimated that 
the state and local.tax burden borne by Wisconsin residents was 79 
27 percent of the total. 
The major part of a.state's tax exporting consists of (1) federal 
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income tax offsets or deductibility of state aI)sd local taxes, (2) non-. 
resident ownership of corporation stocks of the taxing state, and (3) 
the sale of a taxing state's products to out~of-state residents. The 
second.and third components are quite obvious. The first one may need 
some explanation .. Since some state.and local taxes paid by individuals 
or corporations are deductible for federal income tax purposes, they 
could be considered as causing the taxing state's total tax burden to 
decrease. Take for instance the individua~ who files an itemized 
federal income tax return, pays state income tax of $100 and has a 
marginal.federal income tax .rate of 20 percent. In this case, 
loss in real incomes.suffered by non-residents of the taxing state as a 
result of the tax in question. 11 . See his "The Interstate Exporting of 
State ~nd Lqcal Taxes: Estimates for 1962, 11 National Tax Journal, XX 
(June, 1967), p, 51. 
25 Musgrave and Daicoff, p, 146. 
260. H. Brownlee,. "Estimated Distribution of Minnesota Taxes and 
Public Expenditure Benefits, 11 Studies in Economics and Business, No. 21 
(Minneapolis, Minnesota: The University of Minnesota Press, 1960), p. 
1. 
27 Harold M, Groves and W. Donald Knight, Wisconsin's State and 
Local Tax Burden: Impact, Incidence, and Tax Revision Alternatives 
(Madison, Wisconsin: University of Wisconsin Tax Study Committee, 
1959), p. 46, 
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deductibility of the state tax against the federal tax base reduces his 
federal tax by $20. The net additional tax burden resulting from the 
state tax levy is, therefore, only $80, not $100. The $20 tax is 
11 exported 11 to become the burden of the federal government or other 
states. 
There are two major reasons for considering the question of tax 
exporting in a state tax study. In the first place, the concern of the. 
tax study could be with the contribution by the federal government and 
residents of other states to the revenues of the taxing state. Out-of-
stat~ residents, for instance, who buy products of the taxing state, 
are contributors to state and local revenues of the taxing state. In 
fact, .some taxes have induced businesses of the taxing state to increase. 
the prices at which they sell products to out-of-state residents. 
Therefore, when considering the removal of such taxes, it should be 
remembered that the reduction in the revenues of the taxing state; for 
a given amount of products sold, would be greater than the amount 
contributed by residents of the taxing state alone, In the second 
place, since the amount of tax export varies with the .kind .of tax under 
consideration, it necessarily affects the over-all incidence of the 
taxing state. For instance, if the amount of the corporation income tax 
which is exported.is very high and this fact was neglected the study 
would show a heavier tax burden on higher income groups. This is the. 
case because the distributic;m of dividends, according to which the 
corporation income tax is usually allocated among income groups (assum-
ing forward shifting), is concentrated on higher income groups, Like-
wise, because of the progressive nature of the individual income tax, 
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omission of the federal tax offsets would generally result in a heavier 
burden ·on higher income.classes than ie usually the case. 
Obviously, these are good reasons for estimating tax exports in the 
study of state tax incidence.· However, due to empirical difficulties, 
none of tqe above noted state tax studies has made an estimation of ntax 
importing. 1128 By,neglecting tax importing, the over-all tax burden of 
the taxing state is understated. 
Even though most empirical.difficulties can be overcome, it is· 
questionable whether tax imports aI!,d exporte should be estimated 
separately. It ha,s been argued that.there is some doubt whether an 
individual, or .a group.of individuals, who takes the advantages of tax. 
deductio'I!,, actually gains. Buchanan and Pauly.have maintained that 
thqse who· take advantage of tax deductio'I!,s may lose and some.· general 
11 . 29 taxpayers may eventua y gain. Tax deductions cause a decrease in the 
total tax yield. Since individuals in higher income groups would have 
higher. deductions, their evalu,aticm of public goo.ds would exceed the 
tax-price paid for these goods. This woul.d cause their demand for 
public goods to in~rease, which induces a need for total.tax yield to 
inC!rease or at-leq.st not to.decrease. Assuming, however, that the 
public expeD;ditures remain constant, the.decreased amount in the 
original total tax .yield, has to be compensated in one, way or another •. 
28Tax importing may be defined as the amount of taxes borne by the 
residents of the taxing. state·as a result of their holding of.out-of-
state corpo~ation stocks, purchaeing oU:t-:-of-state commodities, and hav-
i~g increased share of the federal tax liability due to the federal tax 
deductibility of state and local taxes in other states. 
29 James M. Buchanan and Mark v. Pauly, 110n the Incidence.of Tax 
Deductibility," National Tax Journal, XX.III (June, 1970), pp. 157-67. 
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In a progressive tax system., the higher income groups have·to contribute 
more to the total tax bill. Therefore, they may find themselves in a 
worse situation after the deduction than before it because they would 
eventually have to be taxed at a higher marginal tax rate than before~ 
If this contention is true, the question of tax exporting becomes much 
less significant even from the theoretical point of view. It would be 
useless to estimate the amount of federal tax offset which is a major 
portion of .tax exporting. The deduction-induced decrease in total 
federal tax yield would result in an over-all increase in the federal 
income tax rates. This would offset the previous amount of tax 
deductions and leave the total.state tax burden unchanged. 
In the case of Montana, there are additional reasons to disregard 
the problem of tax exporting. In the first place, Montana, unlike such 
states as Michigan, Minnesota, and Wisconsin, does not have any.industry 
that dominates the natic,mal market. In the second place, it was found 
by McLure that the over-all exporting rate of Montana state and local 
taxes in 1962 came very close to the average exporting rate for all the 
states in the United States. 30 This indeed supports the assumption that 
in Montana, state and local tax exports equal imports so that it is not 
necessary to estimate them separately. However, it must be admitted 
that empirical.difficulties alone would prevent any attempt to estimate 
Montana tax imports. 
Summary 
In this chapter the theory of tax incidence was briefly discussed .. 
30 McLure, pp. 63-64. 
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Then it was argued that the.modern general equilibrium concept of tax 
incidence.was the most meaningful one. Howeyer, as far as the empirical 
study of tax incidence was concerned, it is necessary to.rely heavily 
upon tQe traditional partial theory. It was this latter theory that 
provides the necessary.information to make all the specific tax shifting 
assumptions of the present study. It was further contended that for the 
state of Montana a. meaningful incidence study. would not·. have to investi-
gate empirically the question of tax export and/or import. This chapter 
constitutes the the9retical background of the present study. 
CHAPTER III 
INCOME DIS'I'.RIBUTION IN MONTANA 
The definition of income can significantly influence the.measured 
incidence of taxes. This is the case even if there is perfect knowledge 
concerning the direction and amount that each tax is shifted. T}:le first 
part of this chapter is concerned with a discussion of the concept of 
income used in the present study. Some general estimation problems 
will then be clarHied. Finally,. the series of Montana income distribu-
tion, which .will be used as the denominator of the incidence formula, 
will .be estimated. 
Income Concepts and Their Components 
Income, from an economie;t's point of view, is an expression of 
economic power to command goods and services for the satisfaction of 
human wants. In general,· it consists. of money itself. In many cases, 
however, it may be anything that is satisfaction-yielding and can be 
valued in terms of .money. Goods and services (such as room and board) 
received by individuals without payment is a case in point. 
Robert M. Haig and Henry.C. Simons contend that the "accretion" 
concept of income should be used for the purpose of individual income 
taxation. Haig says that income is "the money value of the net 
li? 
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accretion to one's economic power between two points of time. 111 
Similarly, Simons defined income as 
the algebraic sum of (1) the market value of rights 
exercised in consumption and (2) the change in the value of 
the store of property rights between the beginning and end 
of the period in question.2 · 
According to this definition, all.additions to wealth (economic power 
measured in terms of money) are included, no matter in what form they 
are received or from what source they accrue. Income, therefore, is the. 
sum of not.only factor earnings such as wages, salaries; rents, inter-
ests and profits, but also transfers such as gifts, inheritance, social 
security benefits, gambling profits and cash prizes. It also consists 
of income in kind, imputed income.and both realized and unrealized 
. 1 . 3 capita gains. 
Ideally, the accretion concept of income should be used. as the base 
for the tax incidence formula. This concept appropriately reflects an 
individ.ual I s ability to pay taxes, which is a matter of concern in a tax 
incidence·study. Other concepts of ir:icome might distort the true 
pictu,re of tax.incidence by omitting one or more components. For 
example, if transfer payments. ar.e excluded from the income base, as is 
1Robert M. Haig, 11The Concept of Income: Economic and Legal· 
Aspects," in Richard A. Musgrave and Carl S. Shoup, ed., Readings in 
the Economics of Taxation (Homewood, Illinois: Richard D. Irwin, Inc., 
1959), p. 59. -
2 Henry C. Simons, Personal Income Taxation (Chicago:· The 
University o:f; Chicago Press, 1938), p. 50. 
3In this; income concept, many deductions and exemptior:is, which 
may be incorporated in the actual tax legislation, are disregarded. 
the case in some measures of income, the tax burden on lower income 
4 groups would be overstated. 
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Since available income distribution data are gathered for purposes 
other than the estimation of tax incidence, it is impossible to obtain 
an income series consistent with the accretion concept. Therefore, an 
income series approximating the accretion concept must be derived from 
the existing income data. This concept will be called "broad income" to 
distinguish it from the accretion as well as all other statistical.J,.y 
available income. concepts. Broad income in the present study will, 
therefore, be defined as the Montana adjusted gross income plus the 
following income components received by MontaI).a residents: transfer 
payments, imputed rents, long term capital gains, federal bond interest, 
food and fuel produced and consumed'on fl:l.rms, and dividends of national 
5 banks. 
Obviously, there are other components such as imputed interest, 
retained corporate profits, a portion of income in kind, and other labor 
income.which should be added to adjusted gross income in order to obtain 
a true measure of the accretion concept of income. However, these 
components are not estimated because of the unreliability of the data. 
Some. General Problems in Estimation 
There are four general problems associated with estimating the 
distributioI). of broad income for Montana •. Each of these problems arises 
4For .a brief review of various measures of income and their 
components, please refer to the expository table of Appendix A in the 
present study. 
5 Each of these components will be defined later in this chapter 
when they are derived or estimated. 
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because of the nature and limitati9n of statistical data. The first 
problem concerns the way of c+assifying individuals and families by 
income.bracket. Ideally, a series of broad income distribution (by 
income,bracket, not by factor share, family size, sex, or age) will 
simultaneously show two things:. (1) the number of individuals and. 
families in each of the income brackets that;: are classified by.the size 
of broa_d income; (2) the amount of broad income received by individuals 
and fa.mil~es in each of these broad income brackets. Therefore, this 
series woulq show tha.t in the, say, $3,000 to $5,000 broad income 
bracket th~re are 45,000 individuals and families who_ receive $250 
million broad income in Monta.na in a certain year. 
Unfortunately, available statistical data do not permit the 
derivation of such a series. The available as well as up-to-date data 
incl~de Montana adjusted_gross income distribution by federal adjusted 
gross income brackets·and sta.te aggregates of some income components 
6 which are excluded from Montana adjusted gross income. No data are 
available for the allocation of any one inco.me component by broad 
income bracket. It is true that crude methods (such as the one dis-
cussed in Appendtx B of the present study) can be applied to the 
exist:i,ng data for the adjustment of income concept in classifying 
income ·groups. These methods are rather unr·eliable should they be used 
6rn filing Montana individual income tax returns, the.derivation 
of _Monta.na adjusted gross income is based on the amount of federal 
adj1,1sted gross income reported in, federal individual income tax returns. 
This . is the reason why the Montana returns are classi:Ued by federal 
adjusted gross income bracket for statistical reporting purpose. The 
reader may want to _refer to c~lumns (5) and (6) of the expository table 
in Appendi~ A for a few minor definitional differences between the 
Montana and federal adjusted gross income. 
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to change a series of adjusted gross income distribution from the one by 
adjusted gross income bracket to the;one by broad income bracket. This 
is the case mainly becau$e to shuffle around such a large magnitude as 
the total Montana adjusted gross income--82 percent of the total Montana 
broad income--entails a possibility of making serious errors. There-
fore, under the conditio.n of data availability, an alternative device 
is used so that the ideal -pattern of broad income distribution will not 
be retained but the purpose of equitably measuring tax incidence ratio 
can still be fulrilled. This is what will be done in deriving the 
income base for the present study: 
(1) Take~ as the basej the distribution of Montana adjusted gross 
income from published data concerning Montana individual income tax 
returns. 
(2) Obtain, or e$timate, .the amount of each income component 
excluded from the Montana adjusted gross income but included in the 
Montana broad income. 
(3) Allocate each of the above state totals by federal adjusted 
gross in.come bracket. 
(4) Add, bracket by bracket, every distribution series obtained 
from (3) to the original Montan.a adjusted gross income distribution in 
(1). 
The final result obtained from the above procedure will show the 
distribution of Montana broad income by federal adjusted gross income 
bracket. That is to say, in th.is new distribution series, individuals 
and families are still classified by the size of their federal adjusted 
gross income. However, when the total income of a particular bracket 
is derived, it is the amount of broad income, not adjusted gross income, 
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that is counted as the income receipts of the individuals and families 
in this particular adjusted gross income bracket. In this way, though 
frequency (and percentage) distribution of individuals and families 
remains unchanged for each bracket, total income in each bracket is 
increased by the amount that is due to the definitional difference 
between the Montana adjusted gross and the.Montana broad income. Take 
an imaginary income distribution series for example. The original 
series may show that in the $3,000 to $5,000 federal adjusted gross 
income bracket the~e are 50,000 individuals and families who receive 
$200 million Montana adjusted gross income; but the new series would 
show that these same individuals and families in the same $3,000 to 
$5,000 federal adjusted gross income bracket may receive $240 million 
broad income. The difference of $40 million represents the total 
amount.of those income components that are excluded from the Montana 
adjusted gross income but included in Montana broad income. In a sense, 
therefore, the final result will not provide what may be called "the 
distribution of income" as the term is commonly understood and used. A 
proper term, which is also less confusing, may well be 11 the distribution 
of Montana residents' ability to pay their state and local taxes by the 
size of their incomes for the income taxation purpose. 11 
The reader may wonder at this point about the necessity of going 
through a series of estimating processes to derive 11 something 11 that 
seems to lack analytical neatness. However, a closer look at the issue 
reveals that.such.a process is essential on the basis of sound theoret-
ical reasoning. As noted earlier, regardless of how the term 11 inci-
dence" is defined, definition of income is always crucial. Incomplete 
measures of individual income, which exclude many important sources of 
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consumption and changes in wealth, distort ability to pay. Criticism on 
the use of the narrowly-,-defined income as a denominator of the incidence 
7 ratio in some earlier empirical studies is, therefore, well-grounded. 
Moreover, to measure the incidence ratio with its concolll.itant considera-
tion of individ.uals I ability to· pay and to categorize these individuals 
into various groups are two distinctive issues. That broad income is 
used in the first case while adjusted gross income is used in the second 
can be.accepted .on a pure;I.y theoretical ground •. The advantage of class~ 
ifying individuals and families by the size of adjusted gross income is 
that they represent various income groups which are directly subject 
t ' d ·1· ' 1 8 o taxation un er prevai ing income tax aws. The advantage of using 
broad income as the income base is obvious since it gives a better 
perspective to the question of tax equity. 
Consequently, even without data limitations the above estimating 
process can still be recommended in so far as the purpose of the study 
is to obtain a reasonable income base to be use4 as a denominator in 
the tax incidence formula. This is the reason why it is such a common 
practic~ that;. almost every comprehensive empirical incidence study has 
made use of different income concepts in measuring tax incidence ratios 
7For some criticism in this respect, see Rufus S. Tucker, "Distri-
bution of Tax Burden in 1948, 11 National Tax Journal, IV (September, 
1951), pp. 269-85; David Brainin and John J. Germanis, 11 Comments on 
'Distribution of Property, Retail Sales, and Personal Income Tax Burden 
in California: An Empiric.al Analysis of Inequity in Taxation' by 
Gerhard N. Rostvold, 11 National. Tax Journal, XX (March, 1967), pp. 106-
11; and Werner·Z. Hirsch, The Economics of State and Local Government 
(New York: McGraw-Hill Book·Company, 1970), pp. 67-68. 
8 This advantage should not be overlooked since allocative data for 
the distribution of certain major Mont~na taxes such as income and 
property taxes are available only by adjusted gross income bracket. 
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and in classifying income groups. Musgrave and Daicoff use a "money 
income11 concept to classify income groups while they use "money income, 11 
11money and real income, 1.1 and "money income after federal taxes" to 
derive incidence ratios or effective rates. 9 Groves and Knight utilize 
"adjusted gross income" to categorize individuals and families, but 
11 revised adjusted gross income, 11 "broad income," 11 income after federal 
taxes 11 are used to derive tax to income ratios. 10 W. Irwin Gillespie 
also adopts the same practice; "family money income" is used for the 
classification of income groups, but 11adjusted broad income11 and "broad 
• II d h i b i 1 1 • i 0 d • 11 income· are use as t e ncome ases n ca cu ating nci ence ratios. 
The second estimation problem concerns the selection of a year. 
The year 1967 was.chosen for two reasons. Since data on the distribu-
tion of Montana adjusted gross income are available only for odd-
numbered years, the calendar year 1967 was the latest period for which 
income data were available when the research for the present study was 
undertaken. As far as the tax data are concerned, the most recent 
publication of the Census of Governments, which provides information on 
the collection of important Montana .taxes, covered the fiscal year 
1967 . 12 
9. 
Musgrave and Daicoff, p. 163. 
10 Groves and Knight, p. 49. 
11G·11 · 126 27 and 133 35 i es pie, pp. - , pp· - • 
12consequently, later in this study as tax incidence is measured,. 
tax payment distribution of fiscal year 1967 (except individual income 
tax which is for the calendar year 1967) will be divided by the income 
distribution of calendar year 1967. Generally, for most taxes, the 
amount of collection in fiscal year is somewhat lower .than calendar 
year; thu$ the measured tax to income ratio$ will be lower,than they 
would be had the larger tax collection of a calendar year been used. 
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The third problem deals with the number of income brackets to use. 
It is always possible to combine brackets but almost impossible and 
always unreliable to separate them. In other words, to reduce the num-
her of income brackets and at the same time to widen bracket intervals 
for a certain distribution is always much more reliable and feasible 
than to increase the.number of brackets and narrow bracket intervals. 
Due to this principle, together with two other considerations, it was 
decided to use six brackets in classifying income groups. First, cer-
tain tax allocative data are available only by six income brackets" 
Second, wider bracket intervals make it possible to disregard the 
problem of "bracket movers. 1113 
Finally, since the distribution of income components (and tax 
payments) are not available at the state level it was necessary to use 
data for the United States. In using these data, it is assumed that 
income-earning patterns (such as earnings from holdings of U. S. savings 
bonds and sales of capital stockq) and consumer behavior (such as 
cigarette smoking and food consumption) of an average Montana resident 
follow the pattern found for an average U. S. resident. Moreover, some 
of these allocative data are not available for the calendar or fiscal 
This possible under-estimation of tax incidence ratio for some taxes 
will not be corrected, however. In the first place, the underlying 
income or tax total is relatively unimportant for the purpose of the 
present study, which is primarily to estimate the relative 11distribu-
tion11 of the tax burden among income groups. In the second place, some 
data such as those of local property tax collection is not available for 
such a correction. 
13Because of the change of income concepts in classifying income 
groups, certain individuals and families may move out of their original 
income brackets. For a detailed explanation, please refer to Appendix 
Bin the present study or Gillespie, p. 126. 
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year 1967, therefore, earlier years had to be relied upon., When these 
data are used, it is assumed that relative distribution patterns among 
income groups have not changed since then. Both of these assumptions 
are widely used in all the existing tax incidence studies of a state or 
14 local nature. 
Estimation of Montana Income Distribution 
Adjusted Gross Income Distribution 
The distribution of Montana adjusted gross income in 1967 was 
derived from data supplied by the Montana individual income tax 
15 returns. The original reported distributio~ by 38 federal adjusted 
gross income brackets (ranging from "under $600" to "$100,000 and over") 
was reduced to si~ brackets (from "under $3,000" to "$15,000 and over"). 
By widening the bracket intervals, the amount of Montana adjusted gross 
income and the number of individuals and families in each bracket are 
increased. The results are presented respectively in lines one and nine 
of Table I. 
14According to the estimating problems that have been settled, two 
more points can.be mentioned·in passing. First, it is apparent that the 
last three estimation problems are also common to the estimation of tax 
payment distributions. Therefore, they will not be noted again when tax 
payment distributions are estimated later in the study. Second, it can 
be seen that this incidence study will eventually show final taxes paid 
by Montana individuals and.families in each of the six·federal adjusted 
gross income brackets; but when.these tax payments are divided by the 
income base in each bracket, bracket totals of Montana broad income are 
used to make the division. In other words, each incidence ratio will 
reflect final tax payments as a percent of broad income received by the 
individuals and families in a particular federal adjusted gross income 
bracket. 
15Montana State Board of Equalization, Twenty-Third Biennial Report 
(Helena, 1968), p. 18. 
TABLE I 
DISTRIBUTIONS OF MONTANA INCOMES AND THEIR COMPONENTS IN 1967 
Federal Adjusted Gross Income Bracket (Doilars) 
Under 3,000 5,000 7,500 10,000 15,000 
Incomes and. to to to to and 
Their Components Units a 3,000 4,999 7,499 9,999 14,999 Over Total 
(1) Adjusted Gross thousand 
Income dollars $138, 938 $201,308 $335,978 $280,528 $224,814 $256~572 $1,438,138 
percent 9.7 14.0 23.3 19.5 15.6 17.8 100.0 
(2) Transfer Payments thousand 
dollars 104.,357 29,356 21,480 13,067 7,697 3,043 179,000 
percent 58.3 16.4 12.0 7 .3 4.3 1. 7 100.0 
(3) Imputed Rent thousand 
dollars 6,702 3,586 4,468 11,641 · 16,874 15,521 58,793 
percent 11.4 6.1 7.6 19.8 28.7 26 .• 4 100.0 
(4) Long-Term Capital thousand 
Gains d.olla:,;s 2,602 1,672 2,091 2,509 4,228 33,357 46,458 
percerit 5.9 3.6 4.5 5.4 9.1 71.8 100.0 
(5) Federal Bond thousand 
Interest dollars 1,676 1,369 1,451 1,428 1,982 3,894 11,800 
percent. 14.2 11.6 12.3 12.1 16.8 33.0 100.0 
(6) Food and Fuel thousand 
Produced and Con- dollars 2,592 1,788 1,424 635 540 321 7,300 
sumed on Farms percent 3~.5 24.5 19.5 8.7 7.4 4.4 100.0 
(7) Dividends of thousand 
National Bnks dollars 150 142 209 224 336 2,846 3,937 
percent 3.8 3.6 5.3 5.7 9.3 72.3 100.0 
IJl 
N 
TABLE I, Continued 
Federal Adjusted Gross Income Bracket (Dollars) 
Under · 3, 000 5, 000 · 7, 500 10, 000 15, 000 
Incomes and to to to to and 
Their Components Unitsa 3,000 4,999 7,499 9,999 14,999 Over Total 
(8) Broad Income thousand 
dollars $257,017 $239,221 $367,101 $310,033 $256,501 $315,554 $1,745,426 
percent 14.7 13.7 21.5 17.8 14.7 18.1 100.0 
(9) Individuals and number of 
Families returns 97 ,}40 50,803 54t074 32,656 19,025 9,292 263,590 
percent 37.0 19o3 20.5 12.4 7.2 3.5 100.0 
~etails may not add to totals due to rounding. 




It is assumed, for the purposes of the present study, that the 
number of returns provide a good estimate of the number of families and 
unrelated individuals in each·income bracket. In fact, the total number 
of returns does not differ much from the total number of families and 
16 unrelated individuals as reported in other sources. This same 
frequency distribution of income tax returns will be used in the series 
of broad income distribution as well, since the latter series also uses 
the adjusted gross income to classify individuals and families. 
Transfer Payments .. 
Transfer payments are receipts of individuals and families from 
government (other than government interest) and business for which no 
17 services are rendered currently. The total transfer of payments of 
$179,000 thousand sho~ in line two of Table I is take1;1 from stat:e 
1 . d 18 persona income ata. 
16For instance, in 1970 the 'total number of families and unrelated 
individuals amounts to 264,515 according to the population census. 
Since the number of tax returns would usually be greater than the number 
of families and individuals, the latter number in 1967 would be slightly 
smaller than 263,590; See, U. S. Bureau of the Census, U. _§_. Census of 
Population: 1970, General Populatioq Characteristics, advance report, 
PC (V2)-28, Montana (Washington, D •. C.: U. S. Government Printing 
Office, September,' 1970), p. 3. 
17 . 
These payments include not only cash transfers but also things 
such as the value of free stamps issued under the surplus food and cot-
ton stamp programs. For detailed components 0f transfer payments, see 
u. s. Department of Commerce, National Income; 1954 Edition (Washington, 
D. C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1954), p. 212, Tb. 36; and 
-----.--' Personal Income,~ States, Since 1929 (Washington, D. C.: 
U.S. Government Printing Office, 1956), pp. 131-36. 
18 U. S. Department of ColllI!lerce, Survey .2.f Current Business, XLVIII 
(August, 1968), p. 20, Tb. 52. · 
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Data from the Office of Tax Analysis of the U.S. Department of the 
Treasury are used in allocating transfer payments to the various income 
brackets. This source provides distribution series of many components 
of transfer payments and each of these series records the distributive 
pattern of the components by federal adjusted gross income bracket. 
Unfortunately, the distribution of.business transfer payments is not 
available. Since business transfer payments only amount to about ten 
percent of total transfer payments; it is reasonable to assume that the. 
combined dist~ibution of all other components adequately reflects the 
19 distribution pattern of all transfer payments. The results of 
allocating transfer payments to the various income brackets are 
presented in line two of Table I. 
Imputed Rent 
Imputed rent is the gross rental value ot owner-occupied non-farm 
hous~s less the actual expenses incurred in home ownership, This value 
is calculated in terms of the net return which the individual homeowner 
could have realized by offering his home for rent. The amount of 
imputed rent for Montana is not available from any published source, 
The first thing to.do in estimating the total amount of imputed rent is 
19The combined distt;ibution consists of (1) public benefits and 
pensions, (2) old-age, survivors, and disability insurance benefits, (3) 
other public pensions and retirements, (4) unemployment benefits, (5) 
private and public relief, (6) cash gi:l;ts from others, (7) veteran's 
pensions and compensation, and (8) mustering out pay. The bracket 
intervals of these distributions are broadened from the original data. 
See U. S. Department of the Treasury, Office of Tax Analysis, Project: 
Total U. ~·, Addition to Subproject f., unpublished computer printouts, 
prepared by Computers for Industry and Business, Inc., on the basis of 
BLS-USDA 1961 survey, p, 2088, Tb. 3. 
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to determine the total value of owner-occupied houses. The best 
alternative employment of this amount is then estimated and the result 
is imputed rent for Montana in 1967. 
To determine the total value of owner-occupied houses, the follow-
ing steps are taken: 
(1) From tbe frequency distribution of owner-occupied homes by the 
value of these homes, a total of $1,079,628,000 is obtained to be the 
value of these hcimes in Montana in 1960. 20 
(2) This.value needs to be updated. To do this, it is assumed 
that the increase in the real value of homes from 1960 to 1967 was 
proportional to the increase in the number of homes which, in turn, was 
in proportion to the growth of population between 1960 and 1967. The 
21 latter growth rate in Montana was 2.9 percent. This results in an 
increase in the total value of homes in 1967, at the 1960 price level, 
to $1,110,937 thousq.nd. 
(3) It is necessary to account for the rise in the price level 
from 1960 to 1967. By referring to the price index for housing and 
rent, the total value of owner-occupied homes in 1967 is inflated to 
$1; ·21,}1"'<li>25 h d 22 ;. 4~i'F , t ousan, • 
20 , 
Calculated from U~ S. Bureau of the Census, U. S. Census of 
Housing, 1960, Vol. 1, Pt. 5, No. 28 (Washington, n-: c-:: U. S. Govern-
ment Printing Office, 1963), p. 28-10, Tb. 7. 
21 Calculated from U.,s~ Bureau of the Census, Statistical Abstract 
of the.United States: 1969, 90th ed. (Washington, D. C.: U. S. 
Government Printing Office~ 1969), p. 12. 
22 Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve.System, Federal 
Reserve Bulletin, LV (February, 1967), p. A-64. 
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It is assumed, then, that the rental value of owner-occupied homes 
can be reflected by one of its best employment alternatives--buying 
U, S. Government long-term savings bonds. In 1967, the average interest 
23 yield for these bonds was 4.85 percent per annum. Applying this rate 
to the total value of Montana owner-occupied homes, an amount of 
$58,793 is obtained to be the imputed rent for Montana in 1967, 
The next step is to allocate imputed rent to the various income 
brackets. It is assumed that the owners of high-value homes would pay 
higher rents if they decided not to own homes, and that the value of 
their homes can be reflected by real property taxes they paid, The 
distribution of real property tax payments can be derived from the data 
concerning the real estate tax deduction recorded in the income tax 
returns, The percentage distribution of the latter is as follows (from 
the lowest to the highest.of the six income brackets used in the present 
study): 24 3~7, 6.5, 13.8~ 20,7, 28.0, and 27.3. But this distribution 
does not.properly refl~ct the true distributive pattern of real property 
tax payments mainly because it was derived only from data concerning 
those taxpayers who itemized their deductions. Specifically, it is 
believed that, since lower income recipients usually choose the standard 
deduction, much of their real property taxes are not included in the 
above percentage distribution. Consequently, an adjustment that 
accounts for this exclusion is needed. The adjustment is made by esti-
mating the difference in the frequency distribution by income bracket 
23Ibid., p, A-32. 
24Internal Revenue Service, Statistics of Income 1966: Individual 
Income Tax Returns (Washington, D. C~: 1966), p. 65, Tb. 29, col. 5 
(hereafter: 1966 Individual Returns). 
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between the persens who itemized their real property tax deductions and 
those who owned.their hemes. The result of the estimation has produced 
the following adjustment .factors for the previously derived percentage 
distribution (from the lowest bracket): +7.7, -0.4, -6.2, -0.9, +0.7; 
and -0.9 percent. 25 Theallocat,ed imputed rent by income bracket on the 
basis of the above-derived adjusted distribution of real property tax 
is presented in line three ·of Table I. 
Long-Term Capital Gains 
Due to the i~ck o:l; data, the estimation will be confined to 
realized gains. Capital gains refer to the increase in the market 
value of capital assets such as corporate stocks, bonds, and real 
estate. Long-term capital gains are gains on those assets held for.more. 
than six months. Short-term capital gains result from transactions 
involving assets held less than,six months. The individual income tax 
law of Montana has the . same .· provisioiis as . the f~deral law in regard to 
taxing capital gains. Short-term capital gains in excess of any long-
term capital loss are treated as erdinary income and.counted fully in 
t~e Montana adjuste4 gross.income. One half of the net long-term 
capital gains in excess of any.short-term loss is.counted in adjusted 
gross income; the ether half is non-taxable. Since ene half of the 
25calculated from the following sources: · U •. s. Bureau of the. 
Census; U. ~· Census !?J_ Populatio~, 1960, Vol. 1, Pt. 1 (Washington, 
D. c.: Govermnent ._Printing Office, 1964), p. 1-225; Tb. 95; .Internal 
Revenue Service, 1960 Individual Returns, p. 14, Tb. O; University of 
Mi.c}:ligan, 1960 Survey of Con.sumer Finances, p. 59, Tb. 3-8; and 
-------·-'. 1967 Survey_ of Consumer Finances, p. 55; Tb. 3-8. 
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long-term capital gains is excluded from aq.justed gross .. income; it will 
have to be estimated and included in the income measurement of the 
present study. 
The-excluded amount can be assumed to exactly equal the amount that 
is included in adjusted gross in~ome, therefore, it is only necessary to 
estimate the amoun~ already.counted in adjusted gross income. In order. 
to estimate this latter figure, data furnished by the·. Internal Revenue 
Service were ~elied upon. These data reported the amount of both long-
term and short,-term gains received by Montana residents·in 1967 at a 
, 26 · 
total -of ,$49, 555 th,ousand. They also provide inf0.rmation ;concerning 
the brea_kdown ·bet.wee11-: lon2;,-teon 'and. shor.t-t~rm gains for the United 
States, as a whole, with the long-term gains being 93.75 percent.of the 
27 total. Assuming _that this percentage is also true for Montana, a 
tot~};~1i$46;4.58 th_ous~nd i~ ob-t~ined to be the ,amount of ;Montana long-_ 
term capit~l gains ,whic4: is already itiGlude,d ·-iri. ·:i:ldjusted .gross income. 
The next step is to allocate the.same.amount of $46,458,000 by 
incqme bracket. The best source for this allocation is also furnished 
by the Internal Revenue Service. This source provides dist~ibution of 
long-term capital gains by federal adjusted gross income bracket for 
28 both taxable and non-taxable returns. The breakdown of Montan~ 
long-term capital gains according to the distributive series derived 
from the above source is shown in line four of Table I. 
26 Internal Revenue Service, 1967 Individual Returns, p. 114, Tb. 
38. 
27 Calculated from Ibid., p. 4, Tb. 1.4. 
281 ,Ibid., p. 39, Tb. 13, col. 9. 
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Federal Bond Interest 
Federal bond.interest _consists of intere$t earnings derived from 
holding bonds and other obligations of the U.S. Government. It ·is not 
t~xable under the Montana individual income tax law and is not included 
as part of adjusted gross income for Montana. Therefore, this component 
must .. be added to adjusted gross income. in deriving bread incom~. 
Since the total amount,of federal bond interest received by 
Mentana residents is not.available from any.published source,.it was 
necessary to es~imate.it. It was assumed that the amount of such 
intereet received -.by Mont~na residents is proportional in their holdings 
af U. s. savings bonds. It was alsa assumed that this latter holding 
is . proportional._ ta the holdings of U. S. series E and H savings bonds. 
By the following procedure, it was estimated that federal bond interest 
received by Montana residents was $11,800,000 in 1967. 
The·total amount of federal bond interest for the U.S. as a whole 
· 29 equals $11,813.5 I!lillion. Out of this tota+, about 21.7 percent was 
30 held by individuals and families. This provides a total of $2,563.5 
million of federal bond interest that was received by individuals and 
families. If wa$ found that Montana residents over the years purchased 
about 0~46 percent of the total U. s .. sales of series E and H savings 
29This figur~ is th,e average of fiscal 1967 and 1968 and calculated 
from u~ S. Department _of the Treasury, Annual Report of the Secretary 
of the Treasury .2!!. ~ $tate of Finances: . Statistical Appendix·, Fiscal 
Year Ended June 30, 1968, document No. 3245a (Washington, D. C.: U. S. 
~rnment Printing Office, 1969), p. 211, Tb. 44. 
30 Calculated from data concerning the ownership of federal 
securities outstE!,nding as of June 30, 1967; see Ibid., p. 215, Tb. 47. 
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bonds. 31 The U. S. total of $2,563.5 million is then multiplied by this 
percentage to obtain the above estimate of federal bond interest for 
Montana iIJ. 1967 .• 
The next step is to allocate federal bond interest to the various 
income brackets. For lack of any better sources, it is allocated 
according to the distribution of interest income reported in the 
32 statistical data concerning individual income tax returns. The result 
is presented in line fi.ve of Table I. 
Food.and Fuel.Produced and Consumed on Farms 
The value of food and fuel produced and consumed on farms is taken 
from a U. S. Department of Agriculture publication concerning farm 
income. 33 This value for Montana in 1967 is at the amount of $7,300 
thousand. 34 
The allocation of this total by income bracket is based on the 
distribution of rural farm families. The latter distribution is 
31calculated from Ibid., p. 207, Tb. 41. 
32 Internal Revenue Service, 1967 Individual Returns, p. 12, Tb. 4, 
col, 31. 
33In this publication, however, the amount represents the "value 
of home consumption"--a term differs from the one used in this study. 
The present term is m,!ed because it is consistent .with the one used 
by the U. S. Department of Commerce in its national income series, and 
it signifies that th~s value is derived only from the agriculture sector 
of the economy. See U. S. Department of Agriculture, Farm Income, State 
Estimates, 1949-1968, FIS 214 Supplement (Washington, D. C.: August, 
1969). ----
34Ibid., p, 26, Tb. 6. 
available only for 1960 and by family money income bracket.35 No 
attempt was made to update this series for 1967, not only because the 
distribution pattern of rural farm families seems to have been quite 
stable, but also because there is no reliable data for updating. How-
ever, some adjustment was made to cha-o.ge the series from the family 
36 money income bracket to the adjusted gross income bracket. The 
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adjustment factors for all six brackets were estimated to be +3.8, -2.5, 
-0.7, -0.3, -0.2, and -0.1 percent respectively. When these factors 
were combined with the original percentage distribution (31.6, 27.0, 
20.2, 9.0, 7.6, and 4.5) of rural farm families, the adjusted distribu-
tion series was acquired. On the basis of this series, food and fuel 
produced and consumed on farms is broken down by income bracket, which 
is presented in line six of Table I. 
Dividends of National Banks 
Dividends of national banks are individuals' earnings from holding 
capital stock of .national banks located in Montana. These earnings are 
not taxable under the Montana individual income. tax law. Since.they are 
not included in Mont9-na adjusted gross income, they must be obtained in 
deriving the income.estimate used in the present study. 
The total of these. dividends received by Montana residents amounted 
35 U. S. Bureau of the Census, 
Vol. 1, Pt. 28 (Washington~ D. C.: 
1963), p. 28-107, Tb. 65. 
U • ..§_. Census of Population: 1960, 
U.S. Government Printing Office, 
36A discussion of this adjustment method is found in Appendix B of 
the present study. 
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to $3,937 tpousand in 1967.37 The total is allocated to the various 
income brackets by relying on information concerning the percentage 
distribution of dividends in general by income bracket. This informa-
38 ti.on w~s obtained from the 1967 issue of the Statistics of Income. 
The allocation of dividends of national banks by income bracket is 
recorded in line ,seven of Table I. 
Broad Income Distribution 
It is now possible to derive a series of Montana broad income 
distr.ibution by federal adjusted gross income bracket. It is obtained 
by adding, bracket by bracket, all the estimated income components.and 
their bracket breakdowns to tq.e distriqution of Montana adjusted gross 
income...:..-i.e.~ lines two to seven of Table I are added to line one of 
the same table. The final results are presented in line. eight of Table 
I. The distribution shown therein will be used as the denominators of 
the tax -incidence formula in deriving incidence ratios later in the 
study. 
37 · U. S. Department of the Treasury, Annual Report of. the .Comptrol-
ler of the Currency:_ 1967, pp. 204-205, Tb. B-27. 
38 Calculated .from Internal Revenue Service, 1967 Individual 
Returns, p. 12, Tb. 4, col. 29. 
CHAPTER IV 
MONTANA TAX PAYMENT DISTRIBUTION 
The purpose of _this chapter is to derive a series of tax payment 
distributions which will be used in determining tax incidence ratios. 
The fir:st part of the chapter is devoted to a brief discussion of 
Monta~a state and local taxes. This is followed by a description of 
the method of allocating state and local tax~s by income bracket., 
Finally, the act9al allocation of each tax to the various federal 
adjusted gross income brackets is explained. 
Montana State and Local Taxes 
Fiscal 1967 revenue from the various Montana state and local taxes 
is presented in Table II. The total amount of ,tax revenues shown in 
this table is greater _than a comparable figure of $212,819 thousand 
reported in the 1967 Census of Governments. The individual income tax 
figure ($27,102 thousand) used in this study is for calendar_ 1967 and 
is derived from the, Biennial Report of the Montana State Board of 
Equalization while the census figure ($24,224 thousand) is for fiscal 
1967. The Montana source for the persona+ income tax is used,in lieu of 
the Census of Governments_figure since the former provides a breakdown 
of individual income tax payments. by adjusted gross income bracket. All 
the other tax collection figures in the table are for fiscal 1967 and 
are the -same as _the figures in the census. 
TABLE II 
MONTANA STATE AND LOCAL TAX REVENUE 
IN FISCAL 1967 










Inheritance and Estate 
Severance 
Hunting and Fishing License 
















Source: Montana State Board of Equalization, Twenty-Third 
Biennial Report· (Helena, 1968), p. 18; U.S. Bureau 
of the Census, State Tax Collections in 1968, Series 
GF68-No. 1 (Washington, D. C.: U. S. Government 
Printing Office, 1968), p. 25, Tb. 9; and-----
Census of Governments, 1967, Vol. 7, No. 26 
(Washington, D. C.: U. S. Government Printing Office, 
1970); P• 24, Tb. 18. 
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Several commf?nts are in order.concerning _the tax categories used in 
Table II. Although a more detailed breakdown.for many of these taxes is 
availabl~, the categories reported in this table will be used in· 
determining incidence· rat.ios later in the study. However, in the pro-: 
ced~re of estimating tl;le-distribution of tax payments by.income bracket,· 
some taxes will be subdivided so as to f.acilitate·their,proper alloca-
tions to the various income.brackets! 
It should be.noted that the,figures in Table II for corporatio~ 
iQ.come, highway user, alcoholic beverage and cigarette taxes.include the 
respective coll~ctions of license fees required for the establishment of 
these businesses. A small amount of.the aircraft fuel tax ($497,000) is 
also counted in.highway user taxes •. In addition to the amount.of local 
property taxes collected by local governments, _tota,l. property tax:col-, 
lections.include state property tax revenues of $5,145 thousand. Like-,. 
wise, the sum· of the business license and other taxes con1;1ists, of the 
state co_llection of $2,136 thousand and the local collection of $2,105 
th,ousand that is classified as ''other· and unallocablell in the Censu1;1 of 
Govern.ments, 
Allocative Method and Data 
With the exception of the individual income tax, available: 
statistical da.ta do not provide a. breakdown of the amount. of a tax col-
lected from each of the various income groups. For example, it ·is .known 
from Table II that -in 1967 Montana residents paid $6,262 thousand in 
cigarette tc!,xes. However, information with respect .to th'? portion paid 
by individuals and.· families in the various income brackets is not 
available. Therefore; it is n~ces1;1ary to de-yelop a method of allocating 
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each tax to the various income brackets so that a series of tax payment 
distributions can be obtained. 
In ord~r to appropriately distribute the cigarette.tax to the, 
various income brackets, it is not necessary to.determine at the outset 
the absolute amount of t}:le tax collected from each of.the si:x; income 
groups. If the relative share of the tax among these six income.groups 
can be ascertained, it will then be possible to apportion cigarette tax 
collections by it1come groups. 
It was assumed in Chapter II that.the burden of the cigarette t~x· 
rested.with cigarette consumers. The relative share of the tax burden 
amot1g ·various incame groups is in dir~.ct proportion to the distributii;,n 
of.consumptian expenditure on_c:i,ija.J;'ettes by income bracket. The latter 
distributi.an can be. derived fram the existing data. Accordingly, the 
cigarette t~x can be·allocated_to the various.income brackets. 
rherefore, the derivati9n of tax payment distribution for a certain 
tax consists of the followi"Q.g ste~: (1) On the basis of the_ specific .. 
shifUng assumption(s) made in Chapter II, the amount of ,the tax paid 
by various groups of final ~axpayers-~cansumers, property owners, 
business firms, dividends receivers, or others--is determined; (2) 
An.allocative (or more thax:i one) series is der:i,ved which is most, 
representative of the actual distributive pattern of this particular 
tax al!long.income·classes~ (3) In accordance with the.above derived 
series, the total or a portioI). of the tax is allocated to the vari.ous 
income·brackets. 
From an empirical point of view, the task of this chapter is 
esset?,tially to obta.in various allocative series. Two imp6rtant sources 
of data are relied upon. One is the often-cited income tax return data. 
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published.bi the lnternal Revenue Service. The otheI", edited by Fabian 
Linden and published by the Nationalindustrial Conference.Board, con-
cerns the consumption expenditure patterns -of American hous.ehol,ds •1 The 
first source proviq.es alloca,tive da.ta related to the distribution of 
certain.income and tax categories-such as dividends, farm profits, non-
corporate.business income and real .property.tax. Since the bracket 
classific~tion is in tern).s of adjusted.gross incqme, no .major problems 
ar_e encountered in the use of these data. 
However, one ,point should be noted in using the income tax return 
data. The distributions of income and tax categories by adjusted gross 
income bracket shown in the data are often reported separately for 
taxable returns and non-taxabl.e r.eturns. · Taxable returns are those 
returns wh_ich ,have. an individua],. income tax re:\llaining after the allow-
able tax.credits are deducted; and non-taxable returns _have no income 
tax remaining afte:i;- tax.credits. The distribution of these categories 
based on non-taxable returns. usually_is-concentrated on low income 
recipients., Therefore, the di'stribution based on .taxable returns.data 
alcme will be more progressive as compared to both' taxable and non-. 
taxable retur~ data_.· Apparently~ for the allocation of the.taxes other 
than the individual income tax to· the vari.ous ,income brackets, it: is 
irrelevant whether or not a·particular family or individual has 
individual income· tax liability.__ Consequently, those allocative series 
1Fa~ian Linden, e4., Expenditure Patterns of .the American Family 
(New York: National Industr_ial Conference Boa.rd, 1965). This·study was 
spons.ored, by Life and based on a survey conducted by the U •. S. Depart-
ment of Labor. ·Some of the data p:resented in· this publication is sum-
marized. in the Conference,Board, Inc., A Guide to Consumer Markets: 
1971/1972 (New- York; The .conference Board, Inc., 1971}, p. 148~ .. 
of the present study.which are.derived from income tax retur:n-data are 
based·on.both_taxable and-non-taxable return data.. 2 
Using ·dat_a provided by the National Industrial Conference Board. 
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presents. two probl~ms •. First of a+l, the bracket clai;;.sification of. the 
distributive series is in terms of the size -of-family _money. income. The 
data m~st be adjusted to cqrrespond to adjusted gross income brackets. 
It. is dqne tQ.rough the_ use of an adjustme~t method. discu.ssed in Appendix 
B of the present _study. Additionally; these distributive data.provide 
only "per family and single consumer's" annual.expenditure far the 
various , goods. and • services in · each of the six inc,orile .brackets. For· the 
ta~ -allocative ;purpo_se, however, -reliance• should be .. placed upon "total" 
annual expenditu:i;-e in each of· the income brackets·.. Therefore, the 
Conf_erence Board data as actual+Y used for: the _present study are cqn--
verted to sE!ries of p~rcenta.gE! distributions of total expenditures by 
income brackets.. This is . done. by first multiplying per family and 
single consumer's annual expenditure for each family money income 
br:acket by the number of Montana .individuals and families in these 
2In derivin,g allacative sari.es from income tax. return data there 
are·two minqr computational problems worth mentioning. First,. the: 
adjusted grass income bracket of:$7,000 to $7,999 in the data.spans 
the,$5,'000 to.$7,499 and $7,~00 to $9~,999 income brackets useq. in the 
present; stucly. In ord(;lr to_divide the magnitudes of incqme or tax 
in the former bracket between the_two lattel;' bracketsJI ·a rough,linear 
interpolation is employetj.. Th~s interpolation ii;; based on the, 
magnitudes -of income or tax in the -$6,000 to $6~999 and $8,000 to 
$8,999 brackets. Additionally, in the case of deriving the distribution 
of. real estate tax-deductions.from non-taxable returns, the data do not 
permit 'a divisiqn of the amount of deductions for the $5,000 to $9,999 
income range •. This amount .is usually very small, and therefore; is . 
interpolated.on the basis of.the relative amounts in the $5,000 to· 
$7~499 and $7,500 tC!l $9,999 income brackets of the tax.able returns. 
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brackets.3 The bracket totale are then lumped together·to obtain the 
total expenditure of all families and individuals. Finally, each 
bracket total is converted to a percentage figure by dividing it by the 
total expenditure of all families and individuals. 
Allocation of-Taxes by Income Bracket 
Individual Income Tax 
It was assumed in Chapter II that the individual income taxpayers 
bears the burden.of the personal income tax. The allocation of total 
income tax payments to the six federal adjusted gross_ incom_e brackets 
is rather straightforward. The Montana State Board of Equalization 
biennially reports the net income.tax payment by each federal adjusted 
gross income bracket. Therefore, it is only necessary to widen the 
bracket interval and to sum the bracket_total of tax payments from this 
report, The result is shown in line one of Table IV. For reference; 
the percentage distribution of this tax payment is also calculated and 
shown .in line one of Table III. 
3since tax allocative series take the.form of percentage distribu-
tions, in order to simplify computations each multiplier (i.e., the 
number of-individuals and families in a family money income bracket) 
is represented_by a percentage figure. The figures for the six family 
money income classes in ascending order are 27.9, 17.4, 22.6, 16.3, 
10.8, and 5.0 respectively. They were estimated by T. S. Park of the 
Univereity_of Montana in his unpublished work on the Montana money 
income distributton fqr 1967. His estimation is based on the trend 
line between 1949 and 1959 Montana distribution of families and unre-





















ALLOCATIVE SERIES OF MONTANA TAXES 
(II\ Percentage) 
Federal Adjusted Gross Income Bracket (dollars) 
Under. 3,000 5,000 7,500 10,000 15,000 
to to to to and 
Allocated Items 3,000 4,999 7,499 9, 999 ·. 14 ,999 over Total 
Individual Income Tax 4.4 9.2 18.8 18.1 18.8 30.7 100.0 
Dividends Received 3.8 3.6 5.3 5.7 9.3 72.3 100.0 
Non-corporate Business Income 3 • .4 5.4 8.7 9.2 14.6 58-. 7 100.0 
Farm-Income· 12·..o 14.9 1a15 15.3 17.9 21.4 100.0 
Estate and Trust Income. 5.7 5.6 7. 4 5.7 11.2 64.4 100.0 
Real Estate Tax Deductions 3.7 6.5 12.9 . 21.6 28.0 27.3 100.0 
Total Consumption Expenditures 12.9 12.7 23.3 21.1 17.9 12.1 100.0 
Consumption Expenditure on Gasoline 9.4 13.8 27 .4 23.5 17.8 8.1 100.0 
Consumption Expenditure on Alcoholic Beverages 8.8 11.5 22.5 22.9 19.7 14.6 100.0 
Consumption Expenditure on Tobacco Products 15.2 15.5 25.9 21.6 14.6 7.2 100.0 
Consumption Expenditure on Insurances 7.9 11.0 23.7 22.7 19.9 14.8 100.0 
Consumption Expenditure on Gas and Electricity 19.6 14.1 24.1 19.6 14 .• 2 8.4 100.0 
Consumptipn Expenditure on Telephone and 
Telegraph 15.4 13. 2 23.7 . 20.5 16.7 10.5 100.0 
Const,1111ption Expenditure-on Train and Bus 
Transportation 23.9 13.9 18.3 15.5 12.8 15.6 100.0 
Consumption Expenditure on Recreation and 
Equipment 8.1 11.1 22.1 22.8 21.6 14.3 100.0 
C<msumption Expenditure on House Rent 26.4 20.1 24.7 15.0 9.2 4.6 100.0 
Consumption Expenditure on Food 15.3 13.7 23.7 20.7 16.6 10.0 100.0 
Consumption Expenditure on Rental Car and Bus 
Transportation 26.0 17.9 19.0 14.8 10.8 11.5 100.0 
" . I-' 
TABLE III, Continued. 
Federal Adjusted Gross Income.Bracket (dollars) 
Under 3,ooo · s,ooo· 7,500 10;000 15,000 
to to to to and 
Allocated Items 3,000 4,999 7,499 9,999 14,999 over Total 
(19) Consumption Expenditure on Airplane Transportation 6.6 8.4 11.9 14.6 21.3 37.2 100.0 
(20) Automobile Ownership 8.6 11.6 21.0 20.7 22.5 15.6 100.0 
(21)\ Persons 14 Years Old and Over 47.2 15.9 17.3 9.9 6.5 3.2 100.0 
Sources: (1) Montana State Board of Equalization, Twenty-:'rhir<i ·Biennial Report (Helena, 1968), p. 18. (2) 
Internal Revenue Service, Statistics of Income, 1967: Individual Income Tax Returns (:Washington, 
D. C.: U. S. Government Printing Office, 1969) ,p.24. Tb. 7, Col. 29. (3) I-bid., p. 23, Tb. 7, 
Cols. 7 and 15. . (4) Ibid., p. 23, Tb. 7, Col. 11. (5) Ibid., p. 24, Tb. 7, Col. 43. (6) 
Internal Revenue Service, Statistics of Income, 1966: Individual Income Tax Returns (Washington, 
D. C.: U. s. Government Printing Office, 1968), p. 65, Tb. 29, Col. 5. · (7) Fab:i.an Linden, ed., 
Expenditure Patterns of the American Family (New York: National Industrial Conference Board, 
1965), p.18, row 1. (8) Ibid.,'p. 118, row 6. (9) Ibid., p. 18, row 5. (10) Ibid., p. 18, 
row 6. (11) Ibid., p. 58, row 18; p. 78, row 80; p. 118, row 16, p. 126, row 2; and .p. 142, row 
20. (12) Ibid,., p. 58, rows 29 and 30. (13) Ibid., p. 58, row 35. (14) Ihid., p. 118, rows 
26 and 28. (15) Ibid., p. 18, row 28. (16) Ibid •. ,. p. 58, row 4. (17) Ibid.,. p. 18, row 2. 
(18) Ibid., p, 118, rows 28 and 29. (19) Ibid., p. 118, row 27. (20) Dorothy S. Projector and 
Gertrude S. Weiss, Survey of Financial Characteristics of Consumers (Washington, D. C.: Board of 
the Governor of the Federal Reserve.System, 1966), p. 136~ Tb. A16. (21) U. S. Bureau of the 
Census, Current Population Reports, Series P-60, No. 60, "Income in 1967 of Persons in_..t:.he United 

















MONTANA TAX PAYMENT DISTRIBUTIONS 
(In Thousands of Dollars)a 
Federal Adjusted Gross Income Bracket (dollars) 
Under 3,000 5,000 7,500 10,000 15,000 
to to to to and 
Taxes 3,000 4,999 7,499 9,999 14,999 Over Total 
Individual Income 1,198 2,484 5,105 4,915 5,092 8,308 27,102 
Corporate.Income: 
Case (A), No Shifting 294 278 410 441 719 5,588 7,729 
Case (B), Fully Shifted Forward 997 982 1,801 1,631 1,383 935 
Case (C), Half Shifted Forward 645 630 1,105 1,036 1;051 3,262 
Property: Total 13,878 14,480 23,100 21,967 22,166 23,647 119,237 
Household Real Property 3,836 3,624 5,391 5,903 6,438 5,759 30,950 
Business Real Property 1,434 1,489 2,623 2,471 2,579 6, 772 17,369 
Farm Real Property 2,897 3,401 4,669 3,970 4,242 4,521 23,700 
Household Personal Property 1,107 1,309 2,231 · 2 ,.269 2,469 1,866 11,250 
Business Personal Property 3,595 3,539 6,493 5,880 4,988 3,372 27,868 
Farm Personal Property 1,009 1,118 1,693 1,474 1,450 · 1,357 8,100 
Highway User: Total 3,803 4,267 7,630 6,704 5,651 3,409 31,464 
Motor Vehicle Operator's License 388 131 142 81 53 26 821 
Motor Fuel 2,425 2,997 5,559 4,759 3,637 1,879 21,256 
-...i 
w 
TABLE IV, Continued 
~ederal Adjusted Gross Income Bracket (dollars) 
Und~r 3, 000 5iooo 1·;500 10~000 15,000 
to to to to and 
Taxes 3,000 4,999 7,499 9,999 14,999 Over Total 
15. Motor Vehicle License 957 1,097 _1,870 1,791 1,855 1,319 8,890 
16. Aircraft Fuel 33 42 59 73 106 185 497 
17. Alcoholic Beverages 506 661 1,293 1,316 1,132 839 5,748 
18. Cigarettes 952 971 1,622 1,353 914 451 6,262 
19. Insurance Premiums 232 314 664 639 583 788 3,220 
20. Public Utilities 391 268 424 355 277 224 1,938 
21. Inheritance and Estat_e 160 157 207 160 314 1,804 2,802 
22. Severance 453 446 819 742 629 425 3,515 
23. Hunting and Fishing License 197 271 539 556 527 349 2,438 
24. Business License and Others 346 384 679 643 689 1,501 4,241 
All Taxes: 
25. Except Corporation Income Tax 22,116 24,703 42,082 39,350 37,974 41,745 207,968 
26. With Case (A) 22,410 24,981 42,492 39,791 38,693 47,33~ 215,697 
27. With Case (B) 23,113 25,685 43,883 40,981 39;357 42,680 
28. With Case (C) 22,761 25,333 43,187 40,386 39,025 45,007 
anetails may not add to totals due to roun4ing. 
Source: See text and Table III of the present study. ...... ~ 
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Corporation Income.Tax 
It may be recalled that three alternative assumptions were made in 
regard to the shifting of the corporation income tax. One assumption 
is that all the tax.rests with the owners of corporations. The·owners 
(stockholders) receive dividends.from corporations and bear the tax in 
proportion to the amount of dividends received. Therefore, in this case 
it is appropriate to allocate the.total $7,729,000 corporation income 
tax to the various.income brackets according to the percentage distribu-
tion of dividends received by income bracket. The latter distribution 
is derived from the income·tax,re.turn data and is shown in line two of 
Table III. Allocation of the corporation income tax in accordance with , 
this distribution is presented in line two of Table IV. 
An alternative assumption is that the corporation income tax is 
shifted forward. Forward shifting means tha~ consumers of goods and 
services provided by the corporation bear.the burden of the tax. Since 
the corporation provides many kinds of goods and services, it is most 
likely that the consumer bears the tax in direct proportion to his total 
consumption expenditures on all goods and services. Therefore, the tax 
is allocated to the various income brackets according to the distribu-
tion of total consumption expenditures on all goods·and services which 
is shown in line seven.of Table III. The result is recorded in line 
three of Table.IV. 
On the basis of a.third assumption, one half of the amount of the 
tax is appor,tioned to the various brackets according to, the distributioI). 
of dividends and.the other half, in accordance with the distribution 
of total:consumption expenditures. Line four of Table IV shows the 
result -based on this assumption. 
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Property Tax 
It. was.decided that different shifting assumptions should be made 
for the various types of property taxed. With the exception of the tax 
on farm property, however, data are not available to obtain the exact 
amount of each portion of the tax.collected from the.various types of 
property. Therefore, before the property tax can be allocated to the 
several income brackets it is necessary to estimate the breakdown. 
between real and personal, household and business portion of the tax. 
Since the brea,kdown is an estimation, the results should not be 
regarded as the amount actually collected from each type of property. 
However, the underlying data for these estimates are reliable and the 
eetimating method is reasonable. 
The first step in determinitlg the individual amount of four.of the 
six component parts of the property tax is to divide total property tax 
collections.into real and personal property components. The latter is 
done by multiplying the total by ratios of the assessed value of real 
4 and personal property to the total assessed value of all property. Of 
the total assessed value o.f Montana properties subject to taxes, 49.6 
percent is locally assessed real property, 28.8 percent is locally 
as.sessed personal property, and 21. 6 percent is state-assessed 
5 property. The state-assessed property is comprised mainly of (1) the 
4The assessed value referred to here is coneistent with the 
definition used.by the U.S. Bureau of the Census. In Montana, because 
of the use of property classification law, this value is referred to as 
the taxable value. · At any rate, this is· the amount against which the 
mill~ge is applied. 
5 U. S. Bureau _of the Census, Census of Governments, 196 7, Vol. II, 
Taxable Property Values (Washington, D. C.: U. S. Government Printing 
Office, 1968), p. 102, Tb. 18 (hereafter: U.S. Bureau of the Census,. 
Property Value). 
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franchise, roadway, roadbed and rqlling stocks of railroads; (2) the 
franchises and transmission lines of public utilities; and (3) net 
proceeds of metal mines. Since the breakdown between the r~al and the 
personal portion of the valqe of state-assessed properties .is not avail-
able it is as.sumed tha,t they are distributed equally. Based on this 
type of reae;oning, the assessed value of real property. amounts to 60.4 
per.cent of the total and the remainder (39. 6 percent) is the assessed 
value of personal property. By applying these percentages to the total 
it is :estimated that real property tax collections amounted to $72,019 
thousand and per:sonal property· tax collections were $47 ,218 tb,ousand. 
The n~xt step is. to separate total .real .property tax payments into 
the portions borne by households, businesses, and farmers. The farmers' 
6 
pot:tion. ($23, 700 thousand) is av.ailable from published dat.a. There-
fore, it is necessary only, to estimat.e the hom,:1ehold portion of the -tax 
payments. Thereafter, the ,business portion can be obtained by subtra.ct-
ing the household and farm portion from the .total. 
The estimati.on of the household portion of the real property. tax is 
derived by multiplying the assessed value of non-farm residential 
7 
properti.es by the average mill rate levied on them. Following this 
procedqre, it ·is estimated that the amount of real property taxes 
6This figure is. the average .of CE!,lendar 1966 and 1967 figures. See 
U. S. Department of Agriculture, ·Farm Real Estate Taxes: Rec.ent Trends 
and.Deveiopments, RET-8 (Washington, D. C.: December, 1968), p • .5, Tb. 
2. .. 
7 The assessed-value of non~farm residential real properties 
amo.unted to ,$170 milli_on a'Q.d the average mill rate was 18.206 percent. 
See U. S. ,Bureau of the Census, Property Value, p. 34, Tb. 4, and 
Montana Taxpayers Association, Montana Taxpayer, Vol.. XIII, No. 9 
(Helena: October, 1969), P• 1. . . 
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collect_ed from household real property owners is $30, 950 thousand. 8 The 
business portion of the real property tax _is the residual and amounts to 
$17.,369 tho~sand. 
A similar procedure is followed for the purpose of dividing personal 
property taxes into three compoI\ent parts. Farm personal-property tax 
9 payments amounted to $8,100 thousand. The assessed value of household 
personal propel,"ties in Monta~a is $61,792 thousand. This figure 
includes $15 million of household durable goods, $41.6 million of motor 
vehicles and $5,192 thousand of intangibles _and other unallocable· 
items. 10 As before, the product ($11,250 thousand) of the average mill 
levy rate (18 .,206 percent) and the assessed value provides an estimate 
81t is _believed that this e_stimate is quite reliable. Suppose the 
farm real property tax collection in fiscal 1967 is estimated. The 
assessed. value of Montana farm real pl,"operty in fiscal 1967 amounts to 
141.1 million doll~rs. This figure includes $139 million of acreage and 
farms and $2, l million of ·vacant lots .and others. The average .mill rate 
applied to thiE! value is equal to 16.5 percent (the average mill levy is 
lower in rural areas than in ur.ban areas). The product of the mill 
rate and the.assessed value is then the estimated total of farm real 
prqperty tax col],.ection •. This product i$ $23, 300 thousand. It ia quite 
close tq_ the ,published figure of $23, 700, which is the average of 
calendar 1966 and 1967.. · 
9 The total farm property tax payment in fiscal 1967 amounts to 
$31. 8 mi_ll-ion, This is the averScge of the figures for calendar years 
1966 and 1967, which appear in U, S, _Departmen_t of Agriculture, Farm 
Income:, State Estimates, 1949-l.969, FIS 216 Supplement (Washington, 
D. C.: ·· August, 1970), · p. 77, Tb. 9 and p, 79, Tb. 9. It -is already 
knpwn,that the farm real property ta,x payment amounts to $23.7 million. 
The difference of $8.1 million between the above two figures, therefore, 
represents the ·farm personal property tax payment in fiscal 1967. 
lOTaken and derived from . U, S •. Bureau of the Census, Property 
Value, p. 157, Tb. 22, The assessed value for motor vehicles is 80 per-
cent of the tqtal value of $52 million. The percentage figure is 
derived ··from the datc!l, concerning the ownership of passenger cars held by 
non-farm individuals, _farmers, and producers. These data are provided 
by Raymond W, Gold~mith. in~ National Wealth of the United States in 
the Postwar Period (:E>rinceton, N. J.:· Princeton Un:ivereity Press, 1962, 
;:--260, Tb. B-36; p, 307, Tb. B-86; p, 358, Tb. B-129; ·and p. 348, Tb. 
B...:ll9). (See also Dick Netzer, p. 230, and p. 303). The assessed value 
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of the,amount of .household personal property tax payments. By 
subtracting the farm and household portion of the personal property tax 
from the :total of personal property tax payments ($47;218,000), an. 
estimate of the amount of business personal property tax payments is 
obtained. This figure amounts to $27,868 thousand~ 
Now it is possible to allocate all the property tax components to 
the ·various income brackets. As may be recalled, the portion of the tax 
on.owner-occupied household real property was.assumed to rest with the 
owner and th~. portion on property occupied by renters falls on the 
renter. Therefore, in allocating the household real property tax·it.is 
necessary tQ estimate the relative share of the tax burden between 
owner-occupants. and renter-oe:cupants. The Census of Housing data are 
relied upon for this purpose. Fr.om these data it is found that; the num-
ber of owner-occupied housing units is 61.7 percent of the total, and 
11 the remainder (38.3 percent) is rental houses. These .percentages are 
assumed to reflect the relative share of the total value of houses 
12 between the two types of dwel,.lings.. Using this procedure it is 
for intangibles and others .is·23.6 percent of the total value .of $22 
million.. This percentage is the ratio of the assessed value of house-
hold personal property (including the motor vehicle value) ,to the total 
assessed value of all personal properties. 
11calculated from U~ S. Bureau of the Census, Census of Housing: 
1960, Vol. I, Pt. 5, .No. 28 (Washington, D. C.: U. S. Government Print-
ing Office, 1963), p. 28-7, Tb. 4. These percentage figures are for the. 
year 1960. They are not updated for two .reasons. First, data for 
updating seem unreliable. Second, these percentages come.quite close to 
the 1967 figure for the U. S. --Le. , 61 percent being owner-occupied 
houses (see .University of Michigan, 1967 Survey ef Consumer Finances, 
Ann Arbor; 1967, p. 55, Tb. 3-8). 
12Th" d . b th C f H . d t .is proce ure is necessary ecause e ensus o ousing a a 
do not permit .an estimat.ion of the total va],ue of renter-occupied 
houses. unlike the owner-occupied houses which are reported through a 
frequency distribution of the number of houses by the .value of these 
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estimated that the owners' share of the tax is $19,096 thousand, and 
the renters' share amounts to $11,854 thousand. 
Income tax return data on the distribution .of real estate tax 
deductions are relied upon in allocating the owner's portion of the. 
household real property tax to the various income brackets. This 
distribution is presented in line six.of Table III. The distribution of 
consumption expenditure on house rent (line 16 of Table III) is used in 
allocating the renter's part of the household real property tax to the 
several income brackets. Line six of Table IV shows the distr.ibution of 
household real property tax payments. 
A somewhat different method is used to allocate the tax on house-
hold personal properties. Here, the division between the owner's and 
the renter '.s share is irrelevant in regard to the .motor vehicle. portion 
of the tax payment ($7,571 thousand). Therefore, this portion is 
distributed to the various income brackets on the .basis of the distribu-
tion of automobile ownership by income bracket (line 20 of Table III). 
The rest of the household property tax is allocated to the income 
brackets in the same manner as the allocation of household real property 
tax payments. The distribution of household personal property tax pay-
ments is exhibHed in line nine ·of Table IV. 
It was assumed that a half of the business real property tax 
rested with the owner and that the other half of the tax as well as the 
total amount of the business personal property taxes were shifted to the 
consumer. The portion of the tax which is shifted forward to consumers 
houses~-so that total house value can be estimated from this distribu-
tion--the renter-occupied houses are classified by the amount of gross 
rent. 
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is allocated.to the six income brackets according to the distribution 
of t(;)tal consumption expenditures. In allocating the business part of 
the real property tax, it is necessary to distinguish between the 
portion of the tax which is paid by corporations (52.8 percent) and the 
portio~ of the tax which is paid by non-corporate businesses (47.2 per-
13 cent). In turn, the corporate share ($4,585,400) is distributed in 
accordance with the distribution of dividends received by tl).e various 
income groups and the distribution of non-corporate business income. 
(Table III, line three) is relied upon in allocating the non-corporate 
portio~ ($4,099,100) of the-tax. The distribution of business real 
preperty tax payments is presented.in line seven of Table IV and that 
of business personal property tax payments in line ten of the same 
table. 
In regard to the tax levied on farm.property, it was assumed that 
three-fourths of .the real property.tax and one-:-half .of the persona+ 
property tax.rested with the farmer, whereas one-fourtl). of the real 
prope~ty tax and the.other half of the personal property tax was 
shifted forwa~d to the consumer. The portion of the real and personal 
property tax which fqlls on the farmer is apportioned to the various 
incom.e ·brackets in _accordance with the distribution of farm income 
(Table III, line·fc;>ur)~ The portion of the.real and property tax which 
rests with the consume~ is allocated ;to the six income brackets in 
accordance with the distribution of cqnsumption expenditure on fqod 
13 These percentages are calculated from the data concerning the 
amount of business receipts.obtained by Montana corporations, propri-
etorships ·and partnerships in 1967. See Internal Revenue·Service, 
Statistics of Income, 1967: Business Inc.ome Tax Returns (Washington, 
D. C.: U. S. Government Printing Office, 1970), p. 97, Tb. 2.6, p. 
202, Tb. 3.6 and p. 304, Tb. 5.7. 
shown in line 17 of Table III. The distributions of farm property tax 
payments are presented in lines 8 and 11 of Table IV. 
All of the six component parts of the property tax have now been 
allocated.to the various.income brackets. Therefore, the distribution 
of the property tax payments can be determined by adding all the 




It was.assumed that the motor vehicle operator's license tax 
($821,000) rested with the operator. The tax should therefore.be 
allocated to the various income brackets in accordance with the distri-
bution of persons holding .a driver's license by income bracket. Since 
these figures are not available from any published source it is neces-
sary to make an estimate. It is assumed that the percentage of the 
population 14 years of age and over by income class provides a reason-
able estimate. This latter distribution is derived from the Current 
Population Reports .and is shown in line 21 of Table III. The distr.ibu-
tion of motor vehicle operator's license tax payments is presented in 
line 13 of Table IV. 
It·was assumed that the household portion of the.motor fuel and 
motor vehicle.license taxes rested with the households and the business 
and farm portion was shifted forward to the consumer. Raymond W. 
Goldsmith's data are relied upon to determine the household share (80 
percent) as well as the business and farm share (20 percent) of the 
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The household portion of the motor fuel tax ($17,005 thousand) 
. ' 
is allocated to the various income brackets in.accol;'dance with the 
dist.ribution of consumption expenditure on gasoline (Table III, line 
eight). On th~ other hand, the household portion of the motor.vehicle 
license tax ($7,112 thousand) is d-istributed amo:ng incom~ groups in 
accordance with the distribution of .automobile ownerships. 
Since it was assumed that the business and.farm portion of both the 
motol;' fuel and license taxes was shifted forward to the consumer, it .is 
allocated to the -various income brackets according to the combined 
distribution of total consumption expenditures and consumption expendi-
tures on bus.and rental car transportation (Table III, lines 7 and 18). 
The distributions of motor fuel and motor vehicle license tax payments 
are shown in.lines 14 and 15 of Table IV, respectively. 
It .is assumed that the.business and farm share of the aircraft fuel 
tax can be shifted forward to the consumer. 15 Therefore, the tax is 
allocated to the various income.brackets according to distributive 
patte~ns of expenditure on airplane transportation (line 19 of Table 
III). The result is shown in line 16 of Table IV. 
The distribution of highway user tax payments is recorded in line 
12 of, l'a.ble IV. 
14see-foatnote.12 of this chapter. 
15 It .appears somewhat peculiar to categorize the tax on aircraft 
fuel under the heading of ,highway user taxes. This cate,gortzation is 
used for two reasons: (1) the bulk of the highway user taxes is col-, 
lected from the tax on gasoline which is similar to fuel use_d in air-
craft; (2) the _Censti.s Bureau classifies both.the taxes on gasoline _and 
aircraft fuel under the 11motor fuel 11 category. 
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Alcoholic Beverage and Cigarette Taxes 
Alcoholic beverage and cigarette taxes were assumed to rest wi~h 
the consumer of these products. The allocation of the.alcoholic bever-
age tax by income bracket is made according to the .distribution of 
consumptioI). expenditure on alcoholic beverages as presented in line nine 
of Table III. Th.e reeult. is recorded in. line 17 of Table IV. The 
cigarette tax is apportioned to the various income,brackets in accord~ 
ance with the distribution of consumption expenditure on cigarettes_ 
(Table III, line ten). This is presented in line 18 of Table IV. 
Insurance Premium Tax 
The insurance premium tax was assumed to rest with policy~holders. 
In Ol'.der . to al~ocate .· this tax to policy-holders by income bracket; it is 
necessary.to-estimate the portion of the tax,paid by businesses (includ-, 
ing farmers) and the portion paid by households. 
In order.to determine tQe relative share of premiums collected from 
hauseholds and businesses statistical.data provided by the Insurance· 
Informatioll Institute and the,Inst:f,.tute of Life Insurance are·relied 
upon.' Data from these sources indicat.e that 56 percent of the ,totaJ,. 
ama~nt of insurance-premiums is for life and health insurance whereas, 
16 44 percent is for property and·liabil:f,.ty insurance. 
Two pet;cent of ordinary life insurance.was purchased by business 
firms for e>wners and key emplc;,yees. In _turn, 62.6 percent of total life 
and health insurance premiums is for o~dinary life insurance. Therefore, 
16 Calculated from Insurance Information Institue, Insurance.Facts 
(New: York, 1966)·, p. 10 .and_ p~ 13. . 
it is estimated tha~ 1.3 percent (twa percent of .62.6 percent) of life 
17 · 
and health insurance premiums is_collecte4 from busineseies. On the 
b~sis ,of this· informa.tion it is ·reasonable to assume that. O. 7 perc.ent 
(1.3 percent o-J; 56 percent) of the .tax on life and health ins1,1raq.ce 
premiums is collected from business firms. The remainder is shifted 
backwar.d·to emplc;,yees or rests with households in.case that palic;:les 
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are be>ught directly by. them •. 
Data from the Insu~ance Information Institue make it possible to 
estimate.that.business firms pay 28.5 percent of total property and· 
lia~ility insurance premiums. 18 Of the remaining 71.5 percent of. 
property and liability .insurance premiums, 41 percent is in t~e form of. 
automobile insurance premiums •. According to Goldsmith, nearly 20 per-
cent of the total value of automopiles is owned by business firms. 
C9nsequently, an .additional 8. 2 p_ercent (20 percent of 41 percent) of 
property and liability insurance premiums may be assigned to business. 
The share of tatal property and liability insurance premiums that are 
callected from business firms is estimated to be 36.7 percent (28.5 
percent plus 8.2 percent). Therefore, 16.1 percent .(36.7 percent of 44. 
percent) of ·total property and li~bility insur~nce premiums is collected 
from business firms. By adding this figure to business' share of .life 
and health insurance premiums, it is determined that 16.8 percent.a£ 
total insurance premiums are collected from business firms. Therefore, 
the household share of total insurance. premiums is 83.2 percent. 
17 . See Insti.tute of Life Insurance, Life Insurance Fact Book· (New 
Yark, 1968), p. 19 and p. 22. 
18nerived £ram Insurance Information Institute, p. 10. 
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On the basis of these percentage figures, the business portion of 
the insurance premiums tax is estimated to be $541 thousand. This 
amount is apportioned to the six income brackets in accordance with t~e 
distribution of dividends received. The household portion of the tax 
($2,679 thousand), however, is allocated to the various income brackets 
according to the distribution of consumption expenditures on property, 
automobiles, and health and life insurance (Table III, line 11). Line 
19 of Table IV records the distribution of insurance premiums tax 
payments by income bracket. 
Public Utilities Taxes 
It was assumed. that public utilities taxes are shifted forward to 
the consumer of utility services. In allocating these taxes to the 
various income brackets, they are subdivided into three portions. The 
taxes on electric energy and natural gas ($749 thousand) are allocated 
to the various income brackets in accordance with the distribution of 
consumption expenditures on gas and electricity shown in line 12 of 
Table III. The telephone and telegraph portion of the taxes ($4 71 
thousand) is distributed according to the relative consumption 
expenditures on telephone and telegraph among income groups (line 13 of 
Table III). Finally, the taxes on motor carriers, freight line com-
panies, and private car lines ($718 thousand) are allocated to the six 
brackets in direct proportion to the distribution of consumption 
expenditures on train and bus transportation (Table III, line 14). Th~ 
final·result is exhibited in line 20 of Table IV. 
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Inheritance and Estate Taxes 
It was assumed that inheritance and estate taxes were borne by the 
beneficiaries. In many of the existing tax studies, these taxes are 
allocated only to the highest income 'bracket of the entire income range. 
However, such an allocation is believed to be quite unsatisfactory 
because persons in other income brackets are by no means excluded from 
receiving a wealth transfer that is large enough to be taxed. In the 
present study, therefore, these taxes are distributed among income 
groups in accordance with the distribution of income derived from 
estates and trusts (Table III, line five). Line 21 of Table IV shows 
the estimated distribution of inheritance and estate tax payments. 
Severence Taxes 
'l'wo alternative assumptions were made with respect to the shifting 
of severance taxes. First, these taxes were assumed to be entirely 
shifted to the consumer. Second, one half of these taxes was assumed 
to be shifted forward and the other half rested with small producers 
of natural resources. Under the first assumption, the allocation of 
severance taxes by income bracket is made in accordance with the 
distribution of total consumption expenditures. To correctly allocate 
the producer's part of these taxes under the second assumption, it would 
be necessary to have an income distribution series of small producers. 
But, data for deriving such a series are not available. Therefore, due 
to a lack of proper data it is necessary to ignore the second assump-
tion concerning shifting of severance taxes. Consequently, line 22 of 
Table IV is obtained simply by allocating severance taxes to the various 
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income brackets in accordance with the distribution of total consumption 
expenditures. 
Hunting and Fishing License Taxes 
License holders were assumed to bear the burden of the hunting and 
fishing license taxes. In allocating these taxes to the various income 
brackets, details of relative expenditures on hunting and fishing among 
income groups should be relied upon. Such details are not obtainable 
from published sources. Therefore, the data concerning the. distribution 
of consumption expenditures on recreation and equipment (Table III, line 
15) are used to allocate these taxes. The estimated result of these 
tax payment distributions is shown in line 23 of Table IV. 
Business License and Other Taxes 
Business license and other taxes were assumed to be divided evenly 
between consumers and business firms on which they are imposed. The 
portion which rests with consumers is distributed among income brackets 
. 
in accordance with the distribution of total consumption expenditures. 
On the other hand, the business.portion of these taxes is allocated to 
t4e various income brackets according to the distributive pattern of 
non~corporate business income. Line 24 of Table IV exhibits the 
estimate.cl distribution of these tax payments. 
CHAPTER V 
INCIDENCE OF MONTANA TAXES 
The empirical results of the present studyare presented in this 
chapter. The incidence ratios of the various Montana state and local 
taxes will first be derived. This is followed by a discussion of the 
incidence of each of these taxes as well as the over-all incidence of 
the Montana tax syste~. Thereafter, the findings of this investigation 
will be briefly compared with those.of similar studies. In this part of 
the chapter, attention will be given to the reasons that may explain the 
differences in results obtained in this and the other studies. 
Incidence Ratios of the Taxes 
The incidence ratios of all the Montana state and local taxes 
considered in the present study are presented in Table V. It is derived 
from the data presented in Table IV and line eight of Table I of this 
study. For example, the incidence ratio of the cigarette tax is 0.442 
percent for the "$5,000 to $7;499" income bracket (in line eight of 
Table V) and is obtained by dividing $1,622 thousand in line 18 of Table 
IV by $367,101 thousand in line eight of Table I. Each percentage 
figure in Table V, therefore, represents the r~tio of the final tax 


















INCIDENCE RATIOS OF THE MONTANA TAXES 
(In Percent) 
Federal Adjusted Gross Income Bracket (Dollars) 
Under 3,000 5,000 7,500 10,000 15,000 
3,000 to to to to 
and 
Taxes 4,999 7,499 9,999 14,999 Over 
Individual Income 0.466 1.038 1.391 1.585 1.985 2.633 
Corporation Income: 
Case (A), No Shifting 0.114 0.116 0.112 0.142 0.280 1. 771 
Case (B), Fully Shifted Forward 0.388 0.410 0.491 0.526 0.539 0.296 
Case (C), Half Shift~d Forward 0.251 0.263 0.301 0.334 0.410 1.034 
Property 5.400 6.053 6.293 7.085 8.642 7.494 
Highway User 1.480 1. 784 2.078 2.162 2.203 1.080 
Alcoholic Beverages 0.197 0.276 0.352 0.424 0.441 0.266 
Cigarettes 0.370 0.406 0.442 0.436 0.356 0.143 
Insurance Premiums 0.090 0.131 0.181 0.206 0.227 0.250 
Public Utilities 0.152 0.112 0.115 0.115 0.108 0.071 
Inheritance and ~state 0.062 0.066 0.056 0.052 0.122 0.572 
Severance 0.176 0.186 0.223 0.239 0.245 0.135 
Hunting and Fishing License 0.077 0.113 0.147 0.179 0.205 0.111 
















TABLE V, Continued 
Federal Adjusted Gross Income Bracket (Dollars) 
Under 3,000 5,000 7,500 10,000 15,000 
to to to to and 
Taxes 3,000 4,999 7,499 9,999 14,999 Over 
All Taxes: 
15. Except Corporation Income Tax 8.605 10.326 11.463 12.692 14.805 13.229 
16. With Case (A) 8. 719 10.443 11.575 12.834 15.085 15.000 
17. With Case (B) 8.993 10.737 11.954 13.218 15.344 13.525 
18. With Case (C) 8.856 10.590 11.764 13.026 15.214 14.263 






The incidence of the individual income tax is progressive through-
out the income brackets. That is to say, the incidence ratio of the tax 
(or tax-to-income ratio) increases.as the taxpayers' income rises. The 
lowest income group pays 0.466 percent of their broad income for the 
individual income tax. The incidence ratio increases as income 
increases until reaching the highest income bracket where the tax takes 
up 2. 633 percent of broad income. On the average, 1. 553 percent of the 
broad income of all individuals and families goes for the payment of 
the total individual income tax liability. 
Under two of the three shifting assumptions, the incidence of the 
corporation income tax is generally progressive throughout the income 
scale. The highest degree of progression takes place under the 
assumption that the tax rests with the owners. In this case, only 
0.114 percent of the income of the lowest income bracket goes to pay 
the corporation income tax whereas, the incidence ratio for the highest 
income bracket is 1.771. Nevertheless, the incidence ratio (0.112) for 
the "$5,000 to $7,499" income bracket in this case is lower than all 
other brackets. A somewhat milder progression is found in the case 
which assumes that one half of the corporation income tax is shifted 
forward to the . cons·umer, The incidence ratios for the highest and the 
lowest income brackets are 1.034 and 0.251 percent respectively. Under 
the assumption that the tax is fully shifted forward, the incidence of 
the tax is very mildly progressive up to the highest income bracket. 
The incidence ratio is smaller for the highest income bracket when 
compared to all others. The average incidence ratio for the corporation 
income tax is 0.443. 
Contrary to the findings of most other studies, the incidence of 
the property tax is progressive up to the highest income bracket. The 
"under $3,000" income group bears the lightest relative tax 
burden; and the persons in the "$10,000 to $14,999" bracket pays the 
greatest amount of the tax in relation to their income. The incidence 
ratio of the property tax for this latter group is the highest of all 
the taxes considered. Moreover, because of the relative importance of 
the property tax, the average incidence ratio for all the individuals 
and families (6.831 percent) is also the highest of all the taxes. 
The distribution of highway user taxes is very slowly progressive 
up to the "$10,000 to $14,999" bracket and becomes quite regressive 
thereafter. The relative tax burden of those in the lowest income 
bracket is heavier than for those in the highest income bracket. 
Additionally, the incidence ratio for individuals and families in the 
middle income range ($7,500 to $14,999) is twice as large as it is for 
individuals and families in the highest income bracket. So far as the 
average highway user tax burden is concerned, the taxes take up 1.803 
percent of the total broad income of all the individuals and families. 
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The incidence of the alcoholic beverage tax is mildly progressive 
for the three lower income brackets. It is almost proportional in the 
middle income range and becomes regressive at the top end of the income 
scale. Though it is regressive at the top end, the highest income group 
still bears a higher tax burden in relation to their income, than the 
lowest income group. Also, like most of the other taxes, the incidence 
ratio (0.441 percent) for the "$10,000 to $14,999" income bracket is 
the highest of the entire income scale. 
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The incidence ratio for the cigarette tax increases from the first 
to second income bracket. Th,e incidence of this tax can be considered 
proportional for the second through fourth income brackets after which 
it becomes regressive. On the average, 0.359 percent of Montana broad 
income is paid to the state and local government in the form of ciga-
rette taxes. It is interesting to note that this figure is very close 
to that obtained for the alcoholic beverage tax. 
The incidence of the insurance premiums tax is progressive 
throughout the entire income range. The incidence ratio for the highest 
income bracket is almost three times as much as that for the lowest 
income bracket. However, on the average, the insurance premiums tax 
takes up only 0.184 percent of the total broad income of all individuals 
and families in Montana. 
With the exception of the second, third, and fourth income 
brackets, the burden distribution of public utilities taxes among income 
groups is very mildly regressive. The incidence ratio of the second 
income bracket is slightly smaller than the third and fourth brackets 
whose ratios are identical, The highest income group pays only 0.071 
percent of their income for these taxes while the incidence ratio for 
the lowest income group is 0.152 percent. The average incidence ratio 
for public utilities taxes is 0.111. This is the lowest average 
incidence ratio of all taxes considered in the present study. 
The incidence of the inheritance and estate taxes is progressive 
when comparing the first four income brackets with the last two income 
brackets. Relative to their income, the lowest income group pays about 
11 percent of the amount paid by the highest income group. However, 
the incidence for the first four income brackets is approximately 
proportional. The average incidence ratio of these taxes is slightly 
higher than that of public utility taxes. 
A very mildly progressive incidence up to the highest incqme 
bracket is found with respect to severance taxes. The lowest income 
class bears slightly heavier tax burden in relation to their income 
than the. l:iighest::_income class. However, the burden of these taxes in 
general ·is evenly distributed among income groups. The difference 
between the highest and the lowest incidence ratio is only 0.108 per-
cent; whicl:i·is less than the average ratio (0.201 percent) of the six 
i~come brackets. 
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The· incidence· of the hunting and f ishin·g license taxes is similar 
to that: of severance taxes. It .is ·progressive up to the highest incoi;ne 
bracket~-- 'J:he taxes, however, do not take less income from the highest 
incoi;ne bracket: as ·compared to the lowest income bracket and the average 
incid.ence rat::io of. 0 .140 percent:. is smaller than that: of the severance 
t::~x. 
With respect to the business license and other taxes, the incidence 
is progressive thrqugho~t the entire income range. The taxes take 
0 •. 135 percent of individual income at the low end of the income range 
and 0.476 percent at. the top end of the income scale. On the average, 
0. 243 percent· of ·· the total ·broad income of all individuals and families 
goes to the payment.of these taxes. 
Table V also presents-the over-all incidence of the Montana tax 
system. The over-all incidence is progressive before reaching the. 
highest incoi;ne bracket. ~t the high end of the income scale, the inci-
dence becomes somewhat regressive. The heaviest tax burden relative 
to income is borne by individuals and families in the "$10,000 to 
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$14,999" income bracket. Ho~ever, the over-all incidence ratio of this 
income bracket is about six percent higher than that of the lowest 
income.bracket. In other words, the payments of the Montana state and 
local.taxe$ .take more than 15 percent of the income of the "$10,000 to 
$14,999° bracket whereas they-take roughly nine percent.of the inco'me. 
of the lowest bracket. The average incidence ratio for the Montana 
state and local tax system is 12.358. 
The three alternative shifting assumptions used in ailocating the 
corporation income tax to the various income brackets do not change the 
over-all pattern of the incidence of the Montana tax system described 
above. However, different shifting assumptions do cause some changes 
in the degree of progression and/or regression. The assumption that_ 
none.of the tax is. shifted does affect the over-all incidence in a more 
progressive way.than the other two assumptions. Under this_assumption, 
the incidence ratios of the highest two income brackets are nearly 
equal. However, under the other two shifting assumptions, the incidence 
ratio of the higqest bracket is clearly smaller than that of the second 
highest .bracket. 
It is now possible to say.a few words concerning the equity of the 
Montana state and local tax system. Since income is generally cqn-
siqered as the best iudex of the ability to pay taxes; the over-all 
incidence ratios in Tal:>le Vindicate that the Montana taxes are equit-,. 
ably distributed except for the highest income bracket. In order to 
achieve a more·equitable tax system, the Montana state and local 
governments may want to raise the individual income tax rates of those 
individuals and famili~s whose annual adjusted gross income is $15,000 
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and over. Alternatively, they may want to change the rates of other 
taxes or enact a new tax so that the tax-to-income ratio of the highest 
bracket would be increased more than the ratios of the other income 
brackets. 
A Comparison of Findings 
The conclusion that the Montana tax system is generally progressive 
seems to be consistent with Gillespie's findings. 1 However, the con-
c~usions reached in the present study run counter to other similar 
studies. In these studies, the over-all incidence of state and local 
taxes was found to be rather regressive. 2 Therefore, the present 
investigation concludes by making some inquiries into these differential 
results. 
Since the present and other studies made use of different income 
concepts (in deriving the total incqme of each bracket and/or in 
ciassifying income groups) and different income class intervals, it is 
not possible to trace the exact causes that account for the differential 
results between this and some other studies. However, four reasons can 
be advanced as possible explanations for the different conclusions which 
were reached. The first reason concerns the differences in the tax 
systems being investigated. The last three reasons are related to some 
1Gillespie, p. 165. 
2 See Musgrave, Carroll, Cook, and Frane, p. 26, Tb. 6, line 8; 
Musgrave and Daicoff, p. 138, Tb. 5, p. 139, Tb. 6, and p. 140, Tb. 7; 
Groves and Knight, p. 56, and p. 55, Tb. 8; Brownlee, p. 4, Tb. 3; 
Samuel B. Chase, Jr., Maryland Tax Study (College Park, Maryland: The 
University of Maryland, 1965), p. 83; Tax Foundation, Inc., Allocation 
of the Tax Burden,£¥. Income Class (New York, 1960), p. 17, Tb. 10; and 
--------' Tax Burdens and Benefits of Gciverriment Expenditures QY. 
Income Class, 1961 and 1965 (New York, 1967), p. 14, Tb. 3. 
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aspects of assumptions, allocative methods, and general procedure used 
in this and other studies, They explain why some of the other studies 
have reached the conclusion that the incidence of state and local taxes 
is regressive. 
The generally pregressive results.of this study can first be 
attributed to the nature of the Montana tax system, The system contains 
an individual income tax whose rate structure is more progressive than 
most of o.ther states, In 1967; only Alaska and New York adopted a 
3 steeper schedule of individual income tax rates than Montana. Since 
the individual income tax is an important source of tax revenue for 
Mo11ta,na, the over-all incidence of the tax system would be affected by 
this progressive tax. In addition, Montana did not impose a general 
. 4 
ret;ail s.ales tax in 19.67, This would cause the incidence of Montana· 
taxes to be less regressive in cqmparison with other states. The 
reasons are·obvious. First, in most of the other states, the general 
5 re,tail·sales tax has been a very important source of tax revenue. 
3 Please refer to Commerce Clearing House, Inc., State Tax Guide: 
All States (New York: Commerce Clearing House, Inc., 1967), pp. 1501-
1770, 
4A 2-percent general retail sales tax became effective in'Montana 
on July 1, 19 71. See Commerce Clearing House, Inc, , State Tax Review, 
Vql. . 32, No, 13 (March 30, 1971), p, 1. · 
5The 45 states levying the sales .tax (excluding Delaware, 
MiE!sissippi, Montana, New Hampshire, and Oregori) derived abput'32 per-
~e~t of their state t~x revenue from sales taxes in 1967. Out of the 
to1;:ql tax revenue.of both the state and local governments in the U •. S. 
in.1967, 17 percent consisted of tax revenue from the general retail 
sales tax. See U.S. B1;1reau of the Census, State Government Finances.in 
1968(Washington, D. C.:· U.S. Government Printing Office, 1969), p. 
20, Tb. 7; and , Governmental Finances in 1966-6 7 
(Washington, D. C.: U.S. Government Printing Office,1968), p. 20, 
Tb, 4. 
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Second, sales tax collections in empirical incidence studies are 
distributed to the various income brackets in accordance with the 
distribution of total consumption expenditures by income bracket and the 
latter distribution is.often much more regressive than many of the other 
ma~or allocative series. 
In addition, an important practice of some other tax studies tends 
to produce regressive findings. It is common practice to estimate tax 
exporting for various state and local taxes considered without 
simultaneously considering tax im,porting. This results in an over-
estimation of the tax burden of lower income.groups in relation to their 
income. This is the case because all these studies estimate a higher 
exporting rate of those taxes (e.g., individual and corporation income 
taxes) whose incidences are usually progressive, but a much lower 
exporting rate of those taxes (e.g., sales and use, property, and gross 
6 rec~ipts taxes) whose incidences tend to be.regressive. In the 
Michigan Tax Study, for example, it was estimated that nearly 80 percent 
of the corporation franchise tax was shifted out of Michigan, but only 
about 20 percent of the sales tax and 10 to 40 percent of the property 
6As may be recalled, the problem of tax exporting and/or tax 
importing is not handled in the present study due to the limitations of 
statistical data, resources and research time. That is to say, through-
out.the study the amount of tax export for the various Montana taxes is 
assum,ed to be equal to the amount of tax import. Therefore, it is not 
known how the results. of this study may be altered when tax exporting 
and/or tax importing are estimated. In addition, if tax importing in 
other studies is estimated, the results might not be changed to a 
noticeable extent--as in the case if a higher importing rate of progres-
sive taxes were obtained. The point made here, however, is that by 
Looking at the estimates of tax exporting alone, heavier over-all tax 
burden is inevitably placed on the lower income groups. Therefore, this 
point sho~ld not be.considered as a criticism on the estimating methods 
of tax exporting used in other studies. 
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tax were assumed to be exported. 7 To cite another example, Minnesotans 
were assum,ed.to ·bear only two percent.of ·the iron ore occupation tax, 
and one shifting assumption was that the tax was distributed in accord-
ance with the distribution of dividend receivers by income bracket--a 
highly progressive allocative .base. 8 
Another rea~on for the more regressive findings of other studies, 
in contrast to those of the present one, is the way the property tax is 
allocated to the various income prackets. Though other taxes are 
inc~easing in relative importance, the property tax is still the most 
important source o~ tax revenue at the state and local level throughout. 
9 the United States. Therefore, the distributive pattern of the property 
tax by income bracket has a very important impact on the over-all 
incidence of a state tax structure. 
In the present study the generally progressive pattern of the over-
all tax incidence follows the pattern of the property tax incidence. 
whereas, in other similar studies, the regressive over-all incidence 
could be attributed to the regressiveness of the property tax. The 
conclusion that the property tax is regressive is due primarily to the. 
way the tax is allocated to the various income brackets. In the two 
studies done by the Tax Foundation, for ,example, one half of the total 
7 See.Musgrave a~d Daicoff, p. 135, Tp. 2. 
8 Brownlee, p. 27 and p. 28, Tb. 10. 
9 The property tax revenue accounts for nearly 43 percent of the 
total .ta~ revenue of the state and local governments in the Uniteq 
States for fiscal 1966-67, and in Montana the percentage is even higher. 
See U. S. Bureau of the Census, Governmental Finances in 1966-67 
(W~s~ington, D. C.: U. S. Go~ernment Printing Office,1968), p. 18, 
Tb. 3. 
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property tax revenue is. allocated in accordance with the distribution 
of consumption expenditure on housing and the other half according to 
the total consumption expenditures on all goods and services. With 
respect to the allocation of the first half, it implicitly assumes that 
a half of total.property tax collections is derived from household real 
properties. This assumption not only tends to exaggerate the importance 
of the tax on residential real properties--since the amount of the 
residential real property tax collection usually is less than 50 percent 
of the total property tax collection--but entirely disregard the .tax on 
household personal properties. However, the distributive pattern of the 
household personal property tax, essentially owning to the tax on 
automobiles, is often more progressive (or less regressive) than the 
distribution of consumption expenditure on housing.· 
The allocation of the other half of total property tax collections, 
on the other hand, is based on a rather regressive assumption that the 
entire amount of the business and farm portion of the tax is.shifted 
forwar<;l to the consumers. It is regressive because the percentage 
distribution of total consumption expenditures concentrates more on 
lower income groups than the distribution of either business income or 
farm income (on the basis of which the business and farm portion of the 
10 property tax is allocated to the various income brackets). 
10on the basis of the allocative series derived for the present· 
study, the use of the 50-50 allocative method causes the pattern of·the 
Montana property tax incidence to change considerably. The incidence 
ratios for the six income brackets in ascending order become 6.658, 
6.455, 7.503, 7.923, 7.904, and 4.534 percent respectively. It is clear 
that a much more'regressive (or less progressive) incidence results. In 
determining the above ratios, the distribution of consumption. expendi-
ture on housing for the six income brackets in ascending order is 15.8, 
13.2, 22.9, 20.1, 16.1, 11.9 percent respectively (derived from Linden, 
p. 18, row 7) • 
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Finally, regressive findings of some other studies are often due 
to the fact that.these studies do not make allowance for using different 
income measures to classify income groups in the income distribution 
series and the tax allocative series. Generally speaking, if, for the 
purpose·of determining income brackets, the income measure of "alloca-
tive" series is narrower than that of an "income" series, the resulting 
incidence ratios of lower income brackets will be higher than would be 
the case if the same income measure is used in both series. In the 
Michigan Tax Study; for example, family money income is used for the 
classification of income groups in the income distribution series. But, 
because certai~ tax allocative series (e.g., the distributions of 
dividends, capital income, and non-corporate business income) are 
derived from inco.me tax return data, adjusted gross income is used to 
classify income brackets for some of the "allocative" series. It is 
apparent that no adjusti;nent was made to convert these allocative series 
by adjusted gross income.bracket into family money income brackets. 11 
Consequently, for an income bracket at the lower end of the scale (e.g., 
"under $2,000" or "$2,000 to $2,999"), the percentage of individuals 
and families in this income bracket for the allocative series would be 
11Tl;le fact that no such adjustment was made in the Michigan study 
is clear when actually trying to derive a distribution of tax payments 
presented in the study. For this purpose, the distribution of the 
inheritance tax can be selected because its derivation is most straight-
forward. The allocation to the various income brackets of total 
inheritance tax collections shown inTable 3 of the Michigan study (see 
Musgrave and Daicoff, p. 136) is based on the percentage distribution 
of capital income (Ibid., p. 166, Tb. AS) and the amount of $1,660 
thousand federal offset that is solely deducted from the tax alloc.ated 
to the highest income bracket (Ibid., p. 135 and p. 180). However, the 
percentage distribution of.capital income is derived from income tax 
return data without any adjustment made concerning the concept of income 
used in classifying income groups. 
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higher compared to the income series. 12 There are two reasons for 
reaching this conclusion. First, there are many individuals and 
families at the lower end of the income scale who have family money 
income but do not qualify achieving an adjusted gross income. Second, 
there are also many indiv.iduals and families at the lower end of the 
income scale whose family money income may be well over a certain 
bracket limit, but whose adjusted gross income is below this limit. 
Since a number of tax payment distribution series are wholly or 
partially based on the unadjusted allocative series, the higher percent-
age figures for lower income brackets in the latter series bring about 
larger tax payments·for these brackets. As these larger tax payments 
are further divided by the total income of their corresponding brackets 
of the income distribution series, higher incidence ratios are produced 
for the lower income brackets--regardless of whatever concept of income 
is used in deriving the total income of a particular income bracket. 
Therefore, the over-all tax inci,dence as is measured in the Michigan 
study becomes more regressive (or less progressive) than in the case 
12rn the present study, for instance, the percentage of individuals 
and families in the lowest income.bracket is 37.0 in the case when the 
adjuste~ gross income is used to classify income groups; but.the figure 
is 27 1 9 as the family money income is used for the bracket classifica-
tion. See also Appendix B of the present study for an actual case as an 
allocative series is converted from the one by family money income 
br~cket into adjusted gross income bracket, It is seen in the worksheet 
1;:hat after the adjustment the percentage for the lowest income bracket 
increases from 13.0 to 15.2. Therefore, if no adjustment is made, the 
original 13.0 percent, which is for the lowest "family money income 
bracket", is understated. This may also indicate that in the Michigan 
study, at least the percentage of individuals and families (as well as 
income components used in the allocative series) for the lowest (family 
money) income bracket is overstated; and depending upon the distributive 
pattern of an allocative, two, or even three income brackets at the 
lower end of the income range may be overstated. 
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had the same income concept been used for the bracket classification 
in both the income distribution and the tax allocative series. 
Limitations of time and data prevent the present researcher from 
investigating an important empirical problem related to the point just 
mentioned: To what extent.regressive findings of.the Michigan, and 
other similar studies may be changed if the same income measure is used 
for the classification of income bracket in the income distribution and 
~---·-..,p·.,. 
th.e tax allocative series. However, it is interesting to see, with: -· 
the help of a simple numerical example, how and to what extent tax 
incidence.ratios may be distorted if in classifying income group one 
income concept is used in the income series and a different one in the 
tax allocative series. Such an example may also clarify a few points 
13 made in the.two preceding paragraphs. 
Suppose there is an hypothetical four-person economy whose 
distribution of annual incomes are known and presented in Table VI. 
For simplicity, it is assumed that the only definitional difference 
. -...... ~ ........ ,f'" .• ..:• 
13The numbers (the amount of incomes, etc.) used in the example, 
though essentially for the purpose of illustration, are by no means 
designed in such a way as to bring about the results as expected. The 
relative magnitudes among the~e numbers do not usually deviate much from 
the real world situation. For instance, there are two forms of the 
percentage distribution of dividends by income bracket in the example. 
The first one is the distribution by family money income bracket and 
the second, by adjusted gross.income bracket. The percentage figure for 
the low income bracket in.the first distribution is smaller than in the 
second distribution. However, the percentage for the middle income 
bracket in the.first distribution is larger than. in the second. This is 
also the case for the real world situation as shown by statistical data. 
The percentage distribution of dividends received by U. S. families and 
individuals in 1961 by the three equivalent family money income brackets 
used in the numerical example (in ascending order) is 12,20, 21.99, and 
65.81 percent respectively whereas, by the three adjusted gross income 
brackets, the percentages are 17.11, 18.70; and 64.19 respectively 
(derived from U. S. Department of the Treasury, Office of Tax Analysis, 
p. 2059 and p. 2088). 
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betwee~ family (inciuding unrelated individuals) money income and 
adjusted gross income is. transfer payments. Si~ce adjusted gross income 









INDIVIDUAL INCOMES IN AN HYPOTHETICAL 
FOUR-PERSON ECONOMY 
(In Dollars) 
Family Adjusted Transfer 
Money Income. Gross Income Payments 
(1) (2) (3) 
3,500 1,500 2,000 
5,500 4,000 1,500 
9,000 8,000 1,000 
12,500 12,500 0 









Suppose again tb,at the task is set for studying the incidence of 
the only tax in the economy. The tax amounts to $500 total annual col~ 
lections. It .is agreed that the burden of this tax rests with dividend 
receivers and should be distributed accordingly. Two additional agree-
ment.s concerning the details of the incidence . study are also reached: . 
(1)· there are only th,ree income brackets which are "under $5, 00011 , ·· 
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11 $5,000 to $9,999," and 11 $10,000 and over;" (2) the family money income 
concept is used for denominators of the incidence formula. 
In determining incidence ratios, series of income distribution 
and tax payments distribution should first be obtained. The distribu-
tion of family money income by the above three income brackets can 
readily be acquired and is shown in row one (by family money income 
bracket) and row two (by adjusted gross income bracket) of Table VII. 
In deriving tax payments distribution (numerators), however, a tax 
allocative series should be relied upon. This series is the distribu-
tion of dividends and can be acquired from income data shown in column 
four of Table VI. However, the series in the present case can be 
expressed in two forms. The first one is by family money income bracket 
(Table VII, row three) and the second, by adjusted gross income bracket 
(Table VII, row four). Tax payments distributions according to these 
two .versions of the allocative series are shown in rows five and six 
of Table VII respectively. 
Two 11 correct 11 sets of incidence ratios of this tax can now be 
obtained. If the denominators are the distribution of family money 
income by family money income bracket, the numerators should be the 
distribution of tax payments derived on the basis of the allocative 
series by the same family money income bracket. Should the family money 
income distribution be by adjusted gross income bracket, the same 
adjusted gross income bracket should be used in the tax allocative 
series. In these two cases, the incidence of the tax is found to be 
uniformly progressive (Table VII, rows seven and eight), though the 
degree of progressivity differs. However, if the income distribution 
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ALLOCATIVE SERIES 
107 
Income Brackets (In Dollars) 
Under 5,000 10,000 
Items 
Family Money Income Distripution: 
(dollars) 
by Family Money Income Bracket 
by Adjusted Gross Income Bracket 
Tax Allocative Series (Distribution 
of Dividends): (Perce~t) 
by Family Money Income Bracket 
by Adjusted Gross Income Bracket 
Tax Payment Distribution: 
(dollars) 
by Family Money Income Brack~t--
According to (3) 
by Adjusted Gross Income Bracket--
According to (4) 
Incidence Ratios: (Percent) 
by Family Money Income Bracket--
(5) divided by (1) 
by Adjusted Gross Income Bracket--
(6) divided by (2) 
by Income ~racket of Different 
Income Concepts--(6) divided by 
(1) 
to and 
5,000 9,999 Over Total 
3,500 14,500 12,500 
































by adjusted gross income bracket--as in some cases in the Michigan Tax 
Study-~distortion of incidence ratios results. The tax incidence in 
this third case (row nine of Table VII) is no longer unifromly progres-
sive. Thought it is still progressive between the middle and high 
income brackets, it is rather regressive when the lo~ income bracket 
is compared with both the middle and high income brackets. 
In the above example, it is not difficult to pinpoint the reason 
for the distortion that leads to regressive findings. The individual 
Bin the example is a "bracket mover." If family money income is used 
for the classification of income bracket, he is placed in the.middle 
income bracket. Should adjusted gross income be used to classify 
income group, he would belong to the low income group. The incidence 
in the thi~d case is found to be regressive because in deriving inci-
dence ratios, individual B's money income is counted in the middle 
income.bracket, but his tax payment in the. low income bracket. 
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Income Concepts 
.Definition of Income 
'Ille conc!l!pt :includes the 
following -jor income 
components: 
Wages and Salaries 
-Monetary Interests 
Private interests 
State .bond interest 











INCOME CONCEPTS AND THEIR COMPONENTS 
"AccretiQn" Income !"Broad" Income l:\'ersonal Income 
(1) 
The algebraic sum 
of consumption ex-
penditures and the 
change.in net 
worth during a 













The sum of con-
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diture and the· 
change in net 

















iCOllle received by 
esidents from 
11 sources, in-
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11 money - 1Effective buying 
(5) with ~arnings from income minus all 
nor dif:rll sources non-cash income 
erence asrfter deduction 
:hown be- pf personal 
axes 
ex-
yes jes yes yes 
yes yes yes yes 
· no yes yes yes 
yes ·no- yes yes· 
no. no no lio 
yes yes .yes I yes DO no DO DO 
yes no yes yes 
yes yes yes yes 




INCOME CQNC:E!PTS AND THEIR COMPONENTS, Continued 
(1) I (2) I (3) (4) (S) (6) 
Inventory Valuation Adjustment yes no yes no no no 
Capital Gains 
Partly Partiy Long-Term Realized Capital 
Gains yes yes no no yes yes 
Short-Term Realized Capital 
Gains yes yes no no yes yes 
Unrealized Capital Gains yes no no no no no 
Transfer Payments .yes yes yes yes no no 
Other Labor Income yes no yes yes no no 
Income in Kind . . -.: --
Room and Board to Employee yes - no yes no no no 
Food and Fuel Produced and 
Consumed on Farms yes yes yes no no _no 
Personal Contribution to Social 
Income yes yes no yes yes yes 
Personal Taxes -· 
Federal yes _ yes yes yes yes no 
State and Local ves ves ves ves. .no_ ves 
For What Purpo_se was the Concept To tax individual For the present To measute the To demonstrate! To file ITo file 
Developed? income in theory tax incidence productive certain econo- federal Montana in-
study activity and mic character- income dividual in 
performance of istics of the I tax re- come tax 
the economy population in turns returns 
a certain area 
By Whom Was the Concept Henry c. Simons, Same as (1) Off_:l.ce or Bureau of the I Internal Internal _. 
Developed? Robert M. Haig, plus the pre- Business Eco- Census, U.S. I Revenue Revenue 
and others sent writer nomics, U.S. Department of Service_ Service and 
Department of Commerce U.S. !Montana 
Co11111erce Treasur: State Board 
Depart- lof Equi11-
ment zation 
How the Concept was Formed or Economic theory Economic Derived from Derived from jFederal Federal and 
or Data were Compiled theory and business and questionnaire I indivi- Montana in-
existing sta- governmental and interviews1dual in dividual 
tistical data sources during the come tai income tax 
survey year ! returns returns 
Availability of Data on 
Montana 
Income Distribution no yes no yes I yes yes 
















pattern and to 
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to provide market 
Remand information 
O business so as 
o promote sales 
Sales Management, 
lrnc. 








INCOME CONCEPTS AND THEIR COMPONENTS, Continued 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
·Number of Income Size 
Brackets none 6 none 13 17 38 none 7 
Lowest tncome Size Under Under Under Under 
Brackets none $3,000 none $1,000 $600 $600 none .. $0-2,999 
Highest Income Size $15,000 $25,000 $200,000 $100,000 
Brackets none and over none and over or aore and over none over $25,000 
Total Amount of Income For 
Montana in 1967 
(thousands of dollars) none 1,745,426 1.939.000 1 586 417 1.413.401 1.438.138 none 1,564,288 
Sources: Column (1), Robert M. Haig, "The Concept of Income: Economic and Legal Aspects," in Robert M. Haig, ed., The Federal Inc0111e Tax 
(New York: Columbia University Press, 1921), reprinted in Richard A. Musgrave and Carl S. Sharp, ed., Readings in the Economics of Taxation 
(Homewood, Illinois: Richard D. Irwin, Inc., 1959; Henry C. Simons, Personal Income Taxation (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1938). 
Column (2), based on columns (1), (3), (4), (5), (6), (7), and estimations made in the present study. Column (3), u. S. Department of 
Collllllerce, National Income 1954 Edition: A Supplement to the Survey of Current Business (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Goverrnaent Printing Office, 
1954, pp. 58-60) and U. S. Department of Commerce, Survey of Current Business, Vol. 48, No. 8 (August, 1968}, p, 20, Tb, 52. Column (4) ,· 
U.S. Bureau of the Census, U.S. Census of Population: 1960, Vol. I, Characteristics of the Population, Part 28, Montana (Washington, D.C: : 
U.S. Govenunent Printing Office, 1963), p. XXXVII and pp. 28-107, Tb.-65. Column (5), Internal Revenue Service, u. S. Treasury Department, 
Statistics of Income 1967: Individual Income Tax Returns (Washington, n;c.: U. S. Treasury Department, 1969), p •. 122 and p. 170. Column (6), 
Montana State Board of Equalization, Twenty Third Biennial Report· (Helena, Montana, 1968), p, 18 a.nd COlllllercial Clearing House, Inc., State 
Tax Reporter: Montana, and Revised Codes of Montana, 1947. Column (7), Bureau of Labor Statistics, U.S. Department of Labor, Consumer 
Expenditures and Inc~: Urban United States, 1960-61, BLS Report No. 237-38 (April, 1964}, pp. 1-10, or any supplement to these reports. 
C9lumn (8), Sales Management, Inc., Sales l'lanagement: The Marketing Magazine, Vol. 100, No. 12 (New York: Bill Publishers, Inc., June 10, 




METHOD OF ADJUSTMENT OF CERTAIN ALLOCATIVE 
SERIES FROM FAMILY MONEY TO ADJUSTED 
GROSS INCOME BRACKET 
1 ?? 
123 
Federal adjusted gross income was used for the classification of 
income groups in the income and tax payment distribution series. How-
ever, the nature of statistical data does not permit the derivation of 
every allocative series (both for the allocation of income components 
and tax payments) with the same federal adjusted gross income concept. 
Therefore, it is necessary to develop a method to adjust the difference 
in distribution resulting from different income concepts used in the 
classification of income groups. 
Due to the lack of reliable data for the derivation of adjustment 
factors, the method employed here is a crude one. It would be in error 
to claim that the result of the adjustment process used in this study 
would truly represent the exact state of distribution by federal 
adjusted gross income bracket. The adjustment will reduce possible 
errors since the logic behind the method itself is reasonable. 1 More-
over, others have employed a similar method for the same purpose except 
in the reverse order--i.e., from adjusted gross income to family money 
2 income brackets. 
In developing the adjustment method, attention should first be 
given to the difference between the family money and adjusted gross 
income concepts. There are a number of definitional differences (as 
represented by different income components) between these two concepts. 
1For some criticism on the studies where no such adjustment was 
made, see Peter Newman,!:_ Study of the Distribution of the Tax Burden 
in the United States, 1955-1959, unpublished paper (Ann Arbor: 
University of Michigan-;september, 1961), p. 49, par. 4.14. See also 
the final section of Chapter Vin the present study. 
2Ibid., pp. 48-49, pars. 4.11-4.13. 
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However, so far as the magnitudes and distributive patterns are 
concerned, transfer payments are the sole important difference. 3 Family 
money income includes transfer payments while adjusted gross inc~me does 
not. Since the distribution of tran~fer payments is concentrated in 
lower income brackets, it would be expected that the frequency distribu-
tion of income recipients would tend to concentrate more on the lower 
, 
brackets when a certain distributive series is adjusted, with the same 
income size brackets, from family money to adjusted gross income 
bracket. 
An example may clarify the point just noted. Suppose an individual 
has a money income of $3,500. If he is classified by family money 
income bracket (using the same bracket intervals and number of bracket 
used in the text), he would be placed in the "$3,000 to $4,999" bracket. 
Suppose again, out of this $3,500, he received $1,000 in the form of 
old-age and retirement payments. If he is classified by adjusted gross 
income, however, he would be in the "under $3,000" bracket. Because of 
a change in income concept in the classification of income groups, this 
individual moves down one bracket and, therefore, gives a higher 
percentage to the lowest (under $3,000) income bracket. 
Empirically, it is not as yet possible to know how many individuals 
and families have moved away from their original income after the 
change in income concept. It is also not likely to be known how much 
3other components such as federal bond interest and capital gains 
could also be considered, Because of lack of distributive data by 
family money income bracket, they are not considered here in developing 
the adjustment method. 
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income they have taken with them. 4 There are, however, many individuals 
and families who still remain in their original brackets even after the 
change in the concept of income. It is possible, as well as reasonable, 
therefore, to assume that the ratio of·the number of "bracket movers" 
to the total number of individuals and families in a bracket is equiv-
alent to the ratio of transfer payments to total amount of (family 
money) income in this particular bracket. In other words, it may be 
assumed that a change in bracket classifications from family money to 
adjusted gross income would cause the total.amount of transfer payments 
in a certain bracket to move out and be counted in the next lower 
bracket. This assumption is the clue, as well as the base, for the 
method of adjustment used in the present study. 
The adjustment factors based on this assumption can now be derived. 
It is found that about 40 percent of the family money income received 
in the "under $3,000" family money income bracket was in the form of 
transfer payments in 1960. For other brackets in ascending order, the 
5 percentages are 13.5, 5,8, 5.5, 4.0, and 2.2 respectively. Since the 
data for updating this series are unreliable, these percentages are used 
as the adjustment factors. The work sheet on page 127 is an 
illustration of the adjustment procedure. It is used to derive a series 
4unlike the al;>ove,instance, ii: is known for sure that: by using 
the adjusted gross income bracket, this individual will not merely take 
$1,000, but $3,500 away from the total income of the original "$3,000 
to $4,999" bracket. 
5calculated from (1) U. S. Bureau of the Census, U. E.· Census of 
Population: 1960, Vol. I, Pt. 28 (Washington, D. C.: U. S. Government 
Printing Office, 1963), p. 28-107, Tb. 65; and (2) U. S. Department of 
Commerce, Survey of Current Business, XLI (August, 1961), p. 18~ Tb. 
52. 
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for the allocation of the cigarette tax, which was originally 
distributed by family money income brackets, by federal adjusted gross 
income bracket. 
WORK SHEET FOR THE ADJUSTMENT OF CERTAIN ALLOCATIVE SERIES 
fROM FAMILY MONEY TO ADJUSTED GROSS INCOME BRACKETS 
Adjustment Percentage Di.stribution Adjustaent Factors Percent of Persons Percenb!ge Dist~bution 
Procedure- of Cigarette Expencli.tures (Percent of Tran.sf:er (Inc- of K,i:pend:f.- Aft~ the Persona Vere 
lanat:f.on by Fllllily Money Inccme Pa,-nts :f.n Total tures) lfav:f.ng 1-ay Moved INay Fro. Their 
Bracket :ra.:f.l.y Money Inccme) From Or:f.g:f.nal Orig:f.nal Bracket But 
Inc«- of Each Fam.ly llooey Bracket as lnccme Before They Hi>-.re to the 
Bracket Inc- Bracket Coucept Changes 9ezt i.-r Bracket 
(1) - (2) (3) • (1) x (2) (4) • (1) - (3) 
Under $3,000 13.0 40.0 o• . __... 13.0 
$ 3.000 :_ 4,999 16.2 ][ 13 • .5 - 2.2 ~ . 14.0 $ .s.ooo - 7,499 26.2 ][ s.a - 1 • .5- . ~ 24.7 $ 1.SCJO - 9,999 22.2 ][ s.s - 1.2- ~ . 21.0 $10.000 - 14,999 1.5.0 ][ 4.0 - 0.6- .&. . 14.4 $1.5,000 and over 7.4 ][ 2 2 - 0.2- 7.2 
'tOTAL 100.0 
8No one will move out of the lowest bracket. 
Source: Col. (1), please refer to notes on Table tII~ 
Cols. (2) to (5), see the exposition in tu~ Appendix. 
Percentage Distribution 
of Cigarette Bzpenditurea 
by Federal Adjusted Gross 
~- (i.e., After the 
Bracket Movers Move Into 
the llmtt Lower Bracket) 
(.5) • (3) + (4) 
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